Greece is going to pay an indemnification to the heirs of Hadji Daud Farkouh

Hadji Daud Farkouh was a wealthy citizen of the ottoman empire, being owner of the famous Hadji Daud Shipping Company established in Izmir, Turkey.

When hostilities broke in the island of Crete and before Greece's declaration of war against the ottoman empire, the greek navy intercepted and captured the ottoman ship named "Georgios" of the said Hadji Daud Shipping company because its was carrying ammunition to Crete to turkish troops who were trying to put down the revolution. The ship later was named "Crete II" by the Greeks.

Since there was no official declaration of war between Greece and Turkey at the moment of the ship's interception, Greece has violated the laws of war and ows indemnization to the Hadji Daud Farkouh's heirs.

Do you have any information about Hadji Daud Farkouh's children? Their dates and places of birth, marriage and death?

One of his sons was George Farkouh who was given the name of the manager of the Archipelago-American company, at the time one of the steamers named Texas (ex Olympia), transferred to that company together with other 7 ships from the Hadji Daud Farkouh company, on May 1 1912 touched a floating mine outside the Smyrna (Izmir) harbour (Yenikale Fort) and sunk.
George Farkouh was listed in 1918 among the France's enemy civilians prisoners of war at the end of the first word war. Nothing more.

One of his sons, Constantine Farkouh, resident of Izmir Turkey, between 1915 et 1920, abandoned his wife and left for un unknown destination with his girl friend. Do you know where he died and buried?

What about the rest of Hadji Daud Farkouh's children?

By the way read the whole story..

http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0003114.pdf
THE ORIGINS OF THE 1897 OTTOMAN-GREEK WAR:
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
A Master’s Thesis
by
MEHMET UĞUR EKİNCİ
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
July 2006
THE ORIGINS OF THE 1897 OTTOMAN-GREEK WAR:
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University
by
MEHMET UĞUR EKİNCİ
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
July 2006
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.
--------------------------
Asst. Prof. Mehmet Kalpaklı
Thesis Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.
--------------------------
Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.
--------------------------
Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss
Examining Committee Member
Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences.
--------------------------
Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director
iii
ABSTRACT

THE ORIGINS OF THE 1897 OTTOMAN-GREEK WAR:
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur

M.A., Department of History
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı
July 2006

This thesis, pertaining to the underlying factors and developments of the
Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, focuses primarily on the political and diplomatic
proceedings that took place between the Greek occupation of Crete on 13 February
and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire on 17 April. This war broke out,
against the will of the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, as an outgrowth of
the irredentist policies of Greece. The Ottoman Empire expected that the Great
Powers would prevent war, but since the Powers could not take a unanimous
decision for undertaking coercive measures on Greece, they left the two states
alone. The Ottomans were willing to preserve peace, yet they finally declared war
on Greece after the bands of Greek irregulars crossed the border. This monograph,
based on a multi-sided bibliography including Ottoman and British official
documents, intends to shed some light on the international politics of the time.
Keywords: 1897, Ottoman Empire, Greece, Concert of Europe, Abdülhamid II,
Deligiannis, Ethnike Hetairia, Crete, Thessaly.
iv
ÖZET
1897 OSMANLI-YUNAN SAVAŞI’NIN KÖKENLERİ:
BİR DİPLOMATİK TARİHÇE
Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur
Master, Tarih Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı
Temmuz 2006
1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı’nı hazırlayan faktör ve gelişmeleri konu
edinen bu çalışmada esas olarak Yunanistan’ın Girit’i işgal ettiği 13 Şubat ile
Osmanlı Devleti’nin savaş ilânına karar verdiği 17 Nisan tarihleri arasında
meydana gelen siyasî ve diplomatik gelişmeler üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu savaş,
Osmanlı Devleti ve Büyük Devletler’in irâdesine aykırı olarak Yunanistan’ın
yayılmacı politikalarının bir neticesi olarak meydana gelmiştir. Osmanlı Devleti
Büyük Devletler’den savaşı engellemelerini beklemiş; fakat bu devletler
Yunanistan’a uygulanacak zorlayıcı tedbirler üzerinde uzlaşamadıklarından iki
devleti yalnız başlarına bırakmışlardır. Osmanlı Devleti barışın devamından yana
olmasına rağmen Yunan çetelerinin sınırı tecavüz etmesi üzerine Yunanistan’a
savaş ilân etmiştir. Başta Osmanlı ve İngiliz belgeleri olmak üzere çok yönlü bir
kaynakça kullanılarak hazırlanmış olan bu monograf ile dönemin uluslararası
politikalarına ışık tutulması amaçlanmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: 1897, Osmanlı Devleti, Yunanistan, Avrupa İttihâdı, II.
Abdülhamid, Deligiannis, Etniki Eterya, Girit, Tesalya.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Firstly, I would like to thank Professor Stanford J. Shaw for all his
invaluable help, guidance and motivation without which this study would not have
been complete. I am also indebted to the honorable members of the examining
committee, namely Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı, Dr. Oktay Özel and Dr. Nur Bilge Criss
for evaluating and criticizing my thesis thoroughly. I reserve special thanks for Dr.
Criss, for her careful review and proofreading. In addition to these professors, I
benefited greatly from the precious counsels of Dr. Evgenia Kermeli, Dr. S. Hakan
Kırımlı, Dr. Paul Latimer, Dr. Cadoc D. A. Leighton and Dr. David E. Thornton, as
well as the guidance of Dr. Hasan Ünal on the evolution of Greek political culture
and foreign policy. My skill and command of Ottoman Turkish, which was an
integral element of this thesis, owes much to the lectures given by Dr. Nejdet Gök
and Dr. Ahmed M. Simin. The warm hospitality of the staff of T.C. Başbakanlık
Osmanlı Arşivi and Türk Tarih Kurumu, the kind interest of Sevil Daniş, the
perplexing but intriguing remarks of Emrah Safa Gürkan, the friendly
companionship of Harun Yeni in İstanbul and the inspiring support of Veysel
Şimşek, İlker Demir, Polat Safi, İbrahim Köremezli and Demirhan Kobat will
always be remembered by the author. Last but not least, I have to express my
gratitude to my family, relatives and friends for their encouragement, backing and,
most importantly, their tolerance of my capriciousness during the preparation of
this thesis.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................1
CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN GREECE AND GREEK
FOREIGN POLICY.................................................................................................6
2. 1. The Evolution of Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy .......................6
2. 2. The Ethnike Hetairia and the Revitalization of Irredentism.........................11
CHAPTER 3: THE CRETAN CRISIS.................................................................16
3. 1. Cretan Insurrections throughout the Nineteenth Century.............................16
3. 2. The Cretan Insurrection of 1897...................................................................19
3. 3. The Greek Decision of Intervention .............................................................22
CHAPTER 4: THE ROAD TO WAR...................................................................27
4. 1. The First Reactions to the Greek Occupation of Crete.................................27
4. 1. 1. The Ottoman Empire ............................................................................27
4. 1. 2. The Great Powers .................................................................................29
4. 2. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 1............................32
4. 3. Reflections of the Crisis in the Balkan Politics ............................................38
4. 4. The Verbal Note of 2 March: The First Diplomatic Effort by the Powers...42
4. 4. 1. The Ottoman Response to the Verbal Note ..........................................43
4. 4. 2. The Greek Response to the Verbal Note ..............................................44
4. 5. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 2............................48
4. 6. The Escalation of Tension at the Ottoman-Greek Border ............................51
4. 7. The Blockade of Crete ..................................................................................54
4. 8. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 3............................55
vii
4. 8. 1. Further Negotiations .............................................................................55
4. 8. 2. Deadlock ...............................................................................................57
4. 9. Further Developments in the Ottoman Empire and Greece..........................60
4. 10. The Verbal Note of 6 April: The Last Diplomatic Effort by the Powers ...64
4. 11. The First Raid of Greek Irregulars..............................................................66
4. 12. Going to War or Not: The Dilemma at İstanbul .........................................68
4. 13. The Declaration of War ..............................................................................73
4. 14. The Attitudes of the Great Powers towards the War ..................................75
CHAPTER 5: EPILOGUE ....................................................................................78
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................90
APPENDICES.........................................................................................................96
APPENDIX A: Map of the War Region...............................................................96
APPENDIX B: A Proclamation Encouraging Greek Action in Macedonia.........97
APPENDIX C: The Ottoman Attempt for Direct Negotiations with Greece.......98
APPENDIX D: Verbal Note by the Ottoman Empire to the Great Powers..........99
APPENDIX E: The Decision of the Ottoman Council of Ministers on War .....100
APPENDIX F: The Telegram of Czar Nicholas II to Sultan Abdülhamid II.....101
APPENDIX G: Full Texts of the Preliminaries of Peace and the Peace Treaty.103
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In February 1897, shortly after the Christians in the Ottoman island of Crete
had initiated an insurrection, the Greek government sent a fleet and military units
to this island. Facing the occupation of Crete, the Ottoman Empire did not declare
war on Greece and expected a peaceful settlement of the problem. Both states
concentrated troops on their side of the border against the possibility of war. The
crisis on the border escalated for about two months. After a couple of raids by
Greek irregulars into their territory, the Ottomans finally declared war on 17 April.
The war continued for one month. Although the Ottoman troops had occupied
almost the entire Thessaly at the cessation of hostilities, the frontiers before the war
were restored with minor changes in the peace treaty, according to the will of the
Great Powers.
Although this ephemeral war was an unequal contest of two neighboring
states in Southeastern Europe, it still occupied a noteworthy place within world
power politics of the time. While the six Great Powers, namely Austria-Hungary,
Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, had control over almost every single
international development in the world, the progress of events between the Cretan
crisis and the outbreak of the war did not suit with their interests at all. None of the
Powers desired to see an Ottoman-Greek war. Though for a short period, the
2
cabinets in Europe spent considerable effort to prevent it. But when they realized
that the measures they could take would not be able to appease the Greeks, the
Powers let the war happen, with the precondition that it would not change the
balances in the region.
The Ottoman Empire did not have any intention to go to war with Greece,
either. Especially Sultan Abdülhamid II had always been extremely careful to
maintain peaceful relations with other states, as he feared that the empire did not
have enough resources to cope with a serious military threat.1 The severe defeat
against Russia in 1878 and its injurious consequences had led him to keep away
from all forms of international adventurism and polarization and to follow an
absolutely peaceful foreign policy.2 This is why he often resorted to concessions
whenever it became obvious that diplomatic initiatives would not yield any result.
The sultan consented to the de facto losses of Tunisia to France (1881), Thessaly to
Greece (1881), Egypt to Britain (1882) and Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria (1885)
with little opposition in order to decrease the tension in the empire’s foreign
affairs.3 When Crete was occupied by Greek troops, the sultan preserved his
caution and instead of resorting to force, he left the settlement of this problem to
the Great Powers. Although he ordered the dispatch of a massive armed force to the
Greek border, the sultan never had any intention for an offensive. The war was
declared only after the raids from the Greek side of the border began to menace the
security and reputation of the empire.
The main responsibility for the war lay on the shoulders of Greece,
particularly the Greek public, who had kept a burning desire for the materialization
of the Megale Idea, and the Ethnike Hetairia, which endeavored to accomplish this
goal. The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, though arising out of the Cretan crisis, was
1 F. A. K. Yasamee, “Ottoman Diplomacy in the Era of Abdülhamid II (1878-1908),” in Çağdaş
Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, edited by İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999),
227.
2 Selim Deringil, “Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet
İnönü,” in International Journal of Turkish Studies 4: 1 (Summer 1987), 39.
3 Süleyman Kocabaş, Sultan II. Abdülhamid: Şahsiyeti ve Politikası (İstanbul: Vatan, 1995), 205.
3
in fact one of the recurring attempts of Greece in the nineteenth century for
territorial enlargement. The Greeks had made three, almost identical, attempts in
the years 1854, 1878 and 1886. None of these attempts had resulted in war with the
Ottomans, thanks to the intervention of the Great Powers, and the Greeks had even
acquired a sizeable territory in 1881. As the Great Powers were in competition over
Africa and East Asia, and the Ottoman Empire was coping with numerous internal
problems, the Greeks hoped that they could acquire Epirus, or even Macedonia
through a threat to general peace. However, neither their occupation of Crete, nor
their military preparations produced a compromise from any of these states.
Diplomatic efforts by the Powers and the Ottoman Empire were not able to
persuade the Greeks to retreat on their policy. The crisis escalated constantly, and
the activities of the relentless Ethnike Hetairia kindled the flames of war in the end.
The number of studies that especially pertain to the Ottoman-Greek War of
1897 is not very high. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be many ambiguities on
this war in the historical literature, due to its limited nature in terms of time, area
and impact. In addition, sources that provide partial information on the war are
abundant. Apart from the official documents in the Ottoman, Greek and European
archives, there are numerous secondary sources that deal with various aspects of
this incident. Nevertheless, most of the studies on this war have been written by
putting one state, or a few of states, at the center of events and evaluating the
proceedings from that standpoint. For example, Greek scholars have usually
understated the role of Greek government in the origins of the war, and charged the
responsibility for the disaster almost entirely on the Ethnike Hetairia. On the other
hand, most of the Turkish sources, both contemporary and later, portray the belief
that the Great Powers were always in pursuit of a pro-Greek and anti-Ottoman
policy. In addition, studies based on British official documents are written with
observable suspicion towards Russia and Germany; while those based on Western
European archives accommodate considerable disdain towards the Ottomans.
4
Because of such prejudices one often encounters contradictory statements in
different sources.
Although the Ottoman Empire was one of the two sides of the conflict,
Ottoman sources were usually neglected by Greek or European scholars that
studied Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. Even Theodoros G. Tatsios, the author of one
of the most comprehensive works on this war, rightly acknowledges the deficiency
of his book resulting from the omission of Ottoman documents.4 On the other hand,
studies that have been conducted by Turkish scholars are generally prejudiced by
the Ottoman perspective, since they are based, almost exclusively, on sources in
Turkish. A recent book by M. Metin Hülagü5 is a typical example for the latter.
This work is a fairly detailed account of the origins, course and aftermath of the
war based on an extensive collection of primary and secondary sources in Turkish.
But since this study lacks investigation of European sources, it remains somewhat
one-sided and incomplete. Ideally, the better account of the war, as well as its
origins and aftermath, would integrate the information yielded by Ottoman sources
to the historical literature based on European ones, and evaluate the developments
in a critical and comparative outlook.
The aim of this thesis is to present the origins of the Ottoman-Greek War of
1897 from a multi-sided perspective. Since the war was caused by the aggressive
policy of Greece, the second chapter of the thesis is devoted to the political culture
and foreign policy of this state, with special emphasis on the underlying factors of
Greek irredentism, which paved the way to war. In the third chapter the Cretan
crisis, which was the antecedent of the Ottoman-Greek War, will be discussed. The
main part of the thesis is the fourth chapter, which focuses on the diplomatic and
political developments between the Greek occupation of Crete (13 February 1897)
4 Theodore George Tatsios, The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the
Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984),
viii.
5 M. Metin Hülagü, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Çerçevesinde 1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı (Kayseri:
Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001).
5
and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire (17 May 1897) in detail. The
final chapter includes some concluding remarks along with brief information on the
course of war and its aftermath.
The attitudes and actions of the Ottoman Empire on the road to war are
investigated mainly in the Ottoman archival documents and the two contemporary
accounts written by Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî6 and Vecîhî et al.7 The
information on the proceedings among the Great Powers is based on published
British documents, a selective collection of German documents and the worldrenowned
book by William L. Langer.8 The excellent multi-volume work written
conjointly by Driault and Lhéritier,9 the diligent study of Papadopoulos based on
unpublished British documents10 and the monograph of Tatsios are utilized
extensively to trace the policies of not only the Great Powers, but also Greece. In
addition, a large collection of other sources are utilized in order to verify and
support the information yielded by the abovementioned documents and works and,
hence, to reach more reliable conclusions. It is a regret for the author that Russian
sources pertaining to the war, which could give a more complete picture of the
diplomatic developments, are not consulted.
All of the dates in this thesis are given in the Gregorian calendar, even
though different calendars were being used in both Greece and the Ottoman Empire
at that time. The names of people and places are usually based on the spelling in
their original language. Alternative usages of place names, if any, are given in
parentheses.
6 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye ve Yunan Muhârebesi
(İstanbul: Mihran, 1315).
7 Vecîhî ve Rüfekâsı [Vecîhî, et al.], Musavver Tarih-i Harb (İstanbul: İkdâm, 1315).
8 William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890-1902 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1968).
9 Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours
(Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926).
10 G. S. Papadopoulos, England and the Near East: 1896-1898 (Thessaloniki: Hetaireia
Makedonikon Spoudon, 1969).
6
CHAPTER 2
THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN GREECE AND GREEK
FOREIGN POLICY
The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 is an outgrowth of the nineteenth-century
Greek foreign policy. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Great Powers desired to
see this war happen, but their efforts to prevent it proved insufficient against the
determination of the Greeks to fight. Even though the king and government in
Greece showed a mixed attitude towards war during the escalation of crisis, their
irredentist and nationalist policy, which had continued for decades, rendered a
major military conflict with the Ottoman Empire inevitable. At first sight, it might
be difficult to understand why such a small state having limited economic and
military capabilities adopted such a daring foreign policy with little hesitation. In
order to understand this, tracing the development of Greek political culture after the
foundation of modern Greece is essential.
2. 1. The Evolution of Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy
Greece was a peculiar state both in its foundation and development. This is
because, it was not established after a successful revolution supported by a sound
7
enterprise;1 but rather as a result of the mutual endeavor shown by the Great
Powers to keep the existing balance of power within European politics. Indeed, no
matter how much the Greek rebellion was the first step for the separation of Greece
from the Ottoman Empire, the understanding between Russia, Britain and France
played the key role on the foundation of the modern Greek state. In accordance
with the interests of these three Powers, Greece was formed as a monarchy under a
dynasty of Western European origin instead of a republic under the political will of
the Greek population. After creating this state, these Powers also spent
considerable effort to offset its poor economic and political conditions; since
Greece neither had enough economic power, nor political stability, even to survive.
Regardless of these problems, Greek politicians and public stuck to the
dream of territorial enlargement for the sake of liberating their compatriots abroad.
The “Megale Idea,” namely the idea of uniting the whole Greek community under
one flag, was pursued by the modern Greek state right after its establishment, and
this national dream proved to be the leading element within the domestic and
foreign policy of Greece for decades. The artificial nature of the modern Greek
state, the opportunism of the Greek politicians and the existence of an extreme
degree of rapport within the Greek community were the principal reasons for the
development of this expansionist and irredentist policy.
When founded in 1830 as a nation-state, Greece was far from what the
Greek revolutionaries had dreamed of and worked for since the beginning of their
insurrection. Their goal was the independence of the whole Greek community; yet
what they achieved in the end was a rump state comprising only one-fourth of the
Greek population in the world. Around 2,000,000 Greeks still remained in both
1 The Greek rebellion, which broke out in 1821, was in fact a leaderless and generally unorganized
movement with no vital sources or national exchequer which could enable a protracted struggle:
John Alexander Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1944), 1. Hence the Greek onslaught was checked by Ottoman forces within a few
months and conflicts in the Greek mainland went on as a stalemate until the intervention of the
European Powers in October 1827.
8
Ottoman territories and the British-held Ionian Islands.2 As a result, the Greeks
who had been able to obtain independence set themselves to “redeem their
enslaved brethren abroad.” This ambition shortly became the central element of
Greek political culture. With the belief that the adventurous prospect of the Megale
Idea made “their otherwise mundane existence” meaningful,3 the common people
in Greece aimed towards a shared objective as a coherent society.
Despite all foreign oppositions and the precarious financial and military
status of Greece, Greek politicians uniformly kept enunciating irredentist and pan-
Hellenist claims. In a state which was established after a nationalist struggle,
adopting such a policy was obviously an easy way of obtaining popular support.
Since the Greek society had no aristocracy or plutocracy to stabilize public opinion,
“the passionate and unreliable mob of Athens” enjoyed an enormous political
influence.4 Thanks to the strong cultural and commercial relationships between
Greeks who lived in and outside Greece, the political party which most eagerly
defended the Megale Idea received the greatest support from the Greek public.
The conception of the Megale Idea accommodated a certain degree of
variation. While it generally referred to incorporation of the Aegean Islands and the
provinces north of Greece to the motherland, in some circles it was extended into
an imperialistic program for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire by subjugating
the other Balkan peoples to Hellenism.5 After the 1850s, the Greeks tried to
legitimize their irredentist policies by emphasizing the role of Greece between the
East and the West and the country’s mission to civilize the “Oriental East.”6 Their
first attempt to gain territory from the Ottoman Empire through hostility came
2 Douglas Dakin, “The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-33,” in The Struggle for Greek
Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, edited by
Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1973), 177.
3 Thanos Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 41.
4 Sir Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, The Battlefields of Thessaly (London: John Murray, 1897), 23.
5 Leften Stavro Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966),
468.
6 Kostas A. Lavdas, “Reconceptualizing Politics: Concepts of Politics in Modern Greek Political
Culture,” paper for ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop on ‘The History of Political Concepts: A New
Perspective on European Political Cultures’ (Copenhagen, 14-19 April 2000), 20.
9
about during the Crimean War. Greek volunteers in Epirus and Thessaly revolted in
January with support of the Greek government in terms of money and men. It was
the prompt intervention by France and Britain, through the blockade of the Piraeus,
which urged King Otho I of Greece to yield and thus prevented a probable
Ottoman-Greek war.7
The “national” character of Greek politics was underlined in a new internal
crisis which continued between 1862 and 1864. At the end of this crisis, Otho was
overthrown by a military coup, largely because of his failure to pursue the Megale
Idea, and was replaced by a Danish prince, George I. Despite the fact that the
Greek state did not have the economic base for an adventurous foreign policy, the
reign of the new king was also dominated by the theme of expansionism. In
addition to the island of Crete, where the Christian population revolted several
times throughout the nineteenth century, Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia were the
primary loci of Greek interest.
As happened during the Crimean War, the Greeks did not want to miss the
opportunity of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1877. The
breakdown of Ottoman resistance in Plevne and the Russian occupation of Edirne
(Adrianople) in the winter of 1877-1878 encouraged the Greeks to march on
Epirus.8 Especially Theodoros Pangaiou Deligiannis, who was the minister of the
foreign affairs at that time, believed that the occupation of Thessaly and Epirus
without declaration of war would bring a considerable bargaining power to Greece
in the forthcoming peace negotiations. Consequently, the Greek army was ordered
to cross the Ottoman frontier on 2 February 1878; but the conclusion of armistice
between the belligerents on the same day foiled the attempt.9 Nevertheless, the
desire of Britain to counterbalance Russian expansion worked for the Greek aims.
In accordance with the “balance-of power doctrine,” the increase in the influence of
7 Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War 1853-1856 (London: Arnold, 1999), 51-52.
8 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1962), 8: 112.
9 Tatsios, 51.
10
the Slavic elements in the Balkans had to be offset by making concession to
Greece.10 Thus, in the Protocol 13 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire was
required to undertake certain border rectifications in favor of Greece. Although the
sultan resisted ceding territory to Greece for a considerable time, he was finally
persuaded by the Powers to give up Thessaly, excluding the town of Alasonya
(Elassona), and a small portion of Epirus in July 1881. However, the rectification
of frontier did not satisfy the Greeks, who regarded Thessaly only as a partial gain.
Throughout the 1880s, a dichotomy with regard to foreign policy persisted
within the domestic politics of Greece. While Kharilaos Trikoupis, the prime
minister, tried to calm down the supporters of adventurism and implemented a
cautious policy which placed primary importance on domestic reform and
reconstruction, his political rival, Deligiannis, advocated irredentism in the most
ardent way.11 The escalation of tension in the Balkans increased the popular
support to the latter and, accordingly, the National Party of Deligiannis won the
elections in 1885. The territorial enlargement of Bulgaria through the annexation of
Eastern Rumelia the same year induced the new government to take immediate
action. The Greek army was mobilized with the aim of invading Epirus and
Southern Macedonia.12 Greek irregulars attempted to cross the frontier in February
1886, but they were shortly driven away by Ottoman troops. Having settled the
recent Eastern Rumelian Crisis, the Great Powers were not willing to face new
trouble in the Balkans. Thus, once more they undertook the task of preventing an
Ottoman-Greek war. Fleets of the Powers, excluding France, blockaded Greek
10 René Albrecht-Carrié, The Concert of Europe 1815-1914 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968),
290.
11 S. Victor Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977),
10-11.
12 The Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia had convinced the Greeks that obtaining the
connivance and encouragement of at least one of the Powers would yield a similar result for them:
E. J. Dillon, “The Fate of Greece,” in Contemporary Review 72 (July-December 1897), 4.
11
ports in May 1886 and the Greek government was forced to resign. Trikoupis,
forming the new cabinet, accepted demobilization.13
Yet this setback did not give an end to nationalist overtones in Greece, and
the political rivalry between Trikoupis and Deligiannis continued. The latter
became the premier again in 1890, owing to the tense political atmosphere created
by uprisings in Crete; but his ineffective policy resulted in the return of the former
to the premiership with the elections in 1892.14 Nevertheless, Deligiannis still
maintained his popularity and political influence thanks to his artful and populist
demagoguery advocating a “Greater Greece.”15 The strong opposition led by him
finally forced Trikoupis to resign in January 1895, and Deligiannis came to power
once again through a decisive electoral victory that year.
2. 2. The Ethnike Hetairia and the Revitalization of Irredentism
The change in Greek government in 1895 signified an increase in nationalist
tendencies among the public. This increase coincided with the abrupt growth of a
nationalist organization, which would have an extreme influence over Greek
politics in a couple of years. This organization, which called itself the Ethnike
Hetairia (National Society), was established in 1894 by a number of young officers
for the purpose of “raising the morale of the country and to provide support to the
subjugated population.”16 The high level of discontent in the Greek army towards
the Trikoupis government, caused by the decrease in military funds and the
prevention of officer involvement in politics, increased the popularity of this
13 Fahir Armaoğlu, 19. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 556-557; Douglas
Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies,
1993), 29; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 31-46; Karal, 8: 114-115.
14 Tatsios, 60.
15 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67;
Papacosma, 11.
16 Alexander Mazarakis-Ainianos, Istorike Melete 1821-1897 Kai O Polemos Tou 1897 (Athens:
[s.n.], 1950), 291, quoted in Tatsios, 86.
12
organization among officers.17 These officers, affected negatively by the slump in
Greek finances, believed that the territorial enlargement of Greece would be the
only way of acquiring prosperity.18 This idea led the Ethnike Hetairia to work for
the unification of Epirus, Macedonia and, to a lesser extent, Crete to Greece.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, there was an intensive and
multi-sided rivalry over the future of the Balkans in which Greece did not seem to
have a favorable position. Bulgaria had become adjacent to Macedonia after its
annexation of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgarian committees were operating eagerly
to lay the groundwork for a future penetration of Bulgaria in that region. The
Serbians were also uttering their claims over the Slav population of Macedonia. In
addition, Russia and Austria-Hungary were implicitly competing over the Balkans,
and none of them was sympathetic to Greek expansion in the region. The agitations
carried out by consulates of Greece throughout Macedonia19 were no longer
sufficient to keep the Greeks in the race.
Under these circumstances, Greek nationalists were extremely concerned
that the Megale Idea was in danger. Numerous proclamations were published in
newspapers to arouse the interest of the Greek public and government towards the
rivalry over Macedonia.20 Seeing that the future of Ottoman control over the region
was quite uncertain, the Ethnike Hetairia decided to take action without delay.
Obtaining the sympathy of phil-Hellenes throughout the world, the organization
collected a considerable amount of money for its cause. The first Olympic Games,
organized in Athens in April 1896, created a suitable environment for the
organization to meet numerous Greeks from different parts of the world,
particularly from the Ottoman Empire, and arrange their plans concerning
17 George Gavrilis, “Understanding Greek-Ottoman Conflict: Statist Irredentism, Belligerent
Democratization or a Synthesis?” in New Approaches to Balkan Studies, edited by Dimitris Keridis,
Ellen Elias-Bursac and Nicholas Yatromanolakis (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2003), 59.
18 T.C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (henceforth abbreviated as BOA), Y.A.HUS., 363/134.
19 Luigi Villari, “Races, Religions, and Propagandas,” in The Balkan Question, edited by Luigi
Villari (London: John Murray, 1905), 141.
20 See Appendix B for an example of these proclamations.
13
Macedonia. When the insurrections in Crete, which broke out shortly after the
Olympic Games, amplified the Greek antagonism against the sultan, the Ethnike
Hetairia found a suitable atmosphere to commence propaganda for a revolt in
Southern Macedonia.21 Throughout the summer of 1896, small troops of volunteers
in the pay of the Ethnike Hetairia crossed into this region and commenced
agitations.22
Despite the predominance of irredentist ambitions among the Greek public
and politicians, Greece was considered by Abdülhamid as a potential ally against
the Slav element in the Balkans. This is why he had a permanent concern to
maintain good relations with this state, by tolerating to a certain extent the growth
of Greek nationalism in the region.23 After the outbreak of the Cretan insurrection
in 1896, the sultan even had a tendency to bargain sovereignty over Crete with the
Greeks.24 Yet the raids of Greek irregular bands into Ottoman territory were
signaling that diplomatic efforts would not be enough to maintain peaceful
relations between the two states. There was an observable boost of nationalist
feelings in Greece and it was certain that they would go out of control if the
attempt of the Ethnike Hetairia in Macedonia yielded the slightest success. The
sultan reasoned that the raids had to be tackled in the most drastic way so that the
Greeks would be dissuaded from engaging in further adventures that could threaten
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. So, he ordered the troops at the
Greek frontier to “crush the bands and save the honor of the Ottoman army.”25
Military reservists from Selânik (Salonika), Kosova (Kosovo) and Manastır
(Bitola) were also conscripted as reinforcements.26
21 Pierre Mille, De Thessalie en Crète (Nancy: Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1898), 165-166.
22 John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 215; BOA, İ.HUS.,
48/1314S-34.
23 Sabri Sürgevil, “1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı ve İzmir,” in Tarih Boyunca Türk-Yunan İlişkileri
(Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı, 1986), 297; Yasamee, 229.
24 [Sultan] Abdülhamit, Siyasî Hatıratım (İstanbul: Dergâh, 1999), 65.
25 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 46/116.
26 Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1992), 180.
14
The caution of the Ottomans did not permit the bands of Greek irregulars
any concrete achievement, but the incursions were narrated in the Athenian press
with a high level of excitement and exaggeration. The Greek public, thrilled by the
heroic stories in the newspapers, started to believe that the Megale Idea would
come true through the endeavors of the Ethnike Hetairia.27 Receiving the support
of numerous merchants, shopkeepers and other well-to-do civilians,28 the
organization shortly obtained enormous popularity and influence in Greece.
The increase of warlike overtones among the Greek society urged the
Deligiannis government to improve the military power of Greece. Foreign loans
were spent on armament and a training camp for 12,000 men was opened at Thebes
in July 1896.29 Under pressure of the Ethnike Hetairia, the opposition and public,
the government prepared a project of reorganization of the army, which was
eventually approved by the king. Reservists were called to military service and a
massive spending on armaments was launched. Due to the lack of financial
resources, these preparations were carried out through foreign loans, internal
credits and voluntary subscriptions.30 Nevertheless, the premier still kept his
hesitance to intervene in the crisis due to the poor condition of the Greek army and
navy.
The attitude of Deligiannis was harshly criticized by both the opposition
and the Ethnike Hetairia, which desired a pro-active policy for the sake of the
Megale Idea. Especially the latter, assuming the leadership in pursuit of this cause,
started to act more audaciously than before. Through long manifestos published in
newspapers, the Ethnike Hetairia called the Greek nation to force their king and
government to “undertake their responsibilities.”31 In December 1896, the Ottoman
consul in Iasi (Yaş) reported that the organization had purchased 20,000 Gras rifles
27 Tatsios, 88.
28 Henry W. Nevinson, Scenes in the Thirty Days War between Greece and Turkey (London: J. M.
Dent & Co., 1898), 77.
29 Bartlett, 14-16.
30 BOA, HR.SYS., 193/3.
31 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 363/134.
15
from Belgium to arm the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire. He also conveyed
rumors that the committee was planning to incite a revolt in Ottoman lands in the
following spring through contribution of armed bands as well as Ottoman Greeks.32
The Ottoman consuls in the Greek towns of Trikkala (Tırhala), Larissa (Yenişehir)
and Volo (Golos) warned the Ottoman minister in Athens that Greek secret
committees were collecting money to purchase arms and outfits for brigands, while
a massive number of Greek regular forces were being transferred to the Ottoman
frontier.33 When Asım Bey, the Ottoman minister in Athens, asked Deligiannis
about these reports, the premier replied that he had no information on such
developments.34
The increase of irredentist and warlike sentiments in Greece in the 1890s
and the strengthening of the Ethnike Hetairia were simultaneous developments that
fostered each other. The preparations by the Ethnike Hetairia, which were
encouraged by the nationalistic impulse existing within the populace, amplified the
public excitement even further. This vicious circle created an irreversible popular
trend directed towards war. The government’s power and ability to control the
proceedings were reduced severely by the prevailing ambitions among the Greek
society. Only a small spark would be enough to transform this emotional
accumulation into a daring movement. This spark arose from Crete before too long.
32 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 365/12.
33 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 365/44.
34 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/49.
16
CHAPTER 3
THE CRETAN CRISIS
The Cretan Crisis was not the direct cause of the Ottoman-Greek War of
1897, as the war was a consequence of the abiding and ever-growing irredentist
aspirations in Greece. But by creating the momentum for military and national
mobilization in Greece, the crisis in Crete was the main catalyst of the war.
3. 1. Cretan Insurrections throughout the Nineteenth Century
Throughout the nineteenth century, Muslim and Christian inhabitants of
Crete lived in a state of perpetual quarrel, which had turned out to be a sort of
vendetta rather than a conflict due to religious fanaticism.1 These quarrels owed
much to the never-ending aspiration among the Cretan Christians for the union of
the island with Greece.2 Two major insurrections, in 1841 and 1866, were initiated
by them with this aim, causing large casualties on both sides and increasing the
awareness of Europe in the matters of Crete. Fearing that the Great Powers could
intervene in the Cretan question on the side of the Christian Cretans, the Sublime
Porte undertook certain reforms on the island in 1868. Ten years later, the
supporters of union attempted to take advantage of the war between Russia and the
1 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1900), 338.
2 Tatsios, 30.
17
Ottoman Empire by instigating another insurrection. The Greek government also
requested the Great Powers to authorize union, by pointing out the high level of
discontent among the Christian inhabitants of the island. Refusing the detachment
of Crete from Ottoman sovereignty, the Powers advised the Sublime Porte,
articulated in Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, to execute the reforms of 1868
with appropriate modifications in favor of the Christians.3 Upon this provision, the
Ottoman government concluded a convention with the Christian rebels in Halepa
on 23 October 1878.
The Halepa Convention was able to pacify the island for some time, yet, in
fact, the embers in Crete kept smoldering. The annexation of Eastern Rumelia by
Bulgaria encouraged the Christian Cretans to rise up again. The insurrection started
in 1888. In order to restore order, the sultan reversed certain provisions of the
Halepa Convention and sent a Muslim military commander to the island. This
action was protested by the Christian Cretans as well as the Great Powers.4 The
extremist elements among the Christians founded a committee called Epitropi in
September 1894. This committee shortly became a powerful revolutionary
organization devoted to liberating the island from Ottoman “yoke.” The
replacement of Alexander Karateodori Paşa, the Christian governor of Crete, by a
Muslim, Turhan Paşa, on 8 March 1896 totally infuriated the Christians in the
island. A large-scale insurgence broke out shortly after the new governor’s
declaration that he would not allow the Cretan Assembly to convene unless the
Epitropi was disbanded. The Ottoman fort at Vamos was besieged by the Christian
insurgents in May.5 Volunteers from Greece began to flow to the island.
Even though the Greek government seemed to be against armed
insurrection of the Christian Cretans, the public in Greece was extremely sensitive
towards the matters of Crete. This was mainly because of the nationalistic
3 Cemal Tukin, “Girit,” in İslâm Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1996), 14: 90.
4 Selim Sun, 1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Harbi. (Ankara: Genelkurmay, 1965), 17.
5 Tatsios, 75.
18
propaganda carried out by the Ethnike Hetairia.6 The excitement among the Greek
populace was weakening the control of the king and government over the
proceedings. When King George was requested by the Great Powers to stop Greek
support to the Cretan insurgence, he replied that he was unable to retain the
volunteers from departing for Crete, as Greece in its entirety would rise up then in
the name of the Megale Idea.7
Realizing that the efforts of Great Powers would not be able to pacify the
island, the Ottoman sultan and government resorted to self-help and dispatched 16
battalions of troops to Crete to restore order.8 The Great Powers were against any
kind of disturbance in the Near East that would upset the general peace and
stability in the region. Thus, when the Cretan insurrection turned out to be a Greek
separatist movement, they began to send naval forces to the Cretan waters in order
to prevent a direct confrontation between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Greek
and Ottoman governments were respectively advised by the Powers to stop the
ongoing support to the Cretan insurgence and to undertake certain administrative
reforms in the island.9 In order to expedite the reforms, the ambassadors of the
Great Powers in İstanbul prepared a program, which was quite in harmony with the
demands of Christian deputies in the Cretan Assembly.10 The sultan, under pressure
of the Powers, formally promised on 27 August 1896 to execute this program. An
arrangement for the administration of the island was promulgated on 10 September
and a Christian, Georgi Paşa Berovich, was appointed as the governor of Crete for
6 Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908).” (Ph.D. diss.,
Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İzmir, 1994), 153.
7 Édouard Driault, La Grande idée: La renaissance de l’Hellénisme (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan,
1920), 163.
8 Erdoğan Yeğen, “XIX. Yüzyılın Son Çeyreğinde Girit Olayları ve Osmanlı-Yunan ve Büyük
Devletlerin İlişkileri,” in Tarih Boyunca Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE
Başkanlığı, 1986), 285.
9 Adıyeke, 155-156.
10 Beside a number of structural reforms, this program stipulated that the governor of Crete should
be a Christian and two-thirds of civil-service posts should be held by Christians: Tatsios, 79-80.
19
a period of five years with extensive authority.11 The Powers undertook the task of
establishing a new judicial system and gendarmerie in Crete.
3. 2. The Cretan Insurrection of 1897
No matter how decisively the reform process was put into effect by the
Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, it was soon realized that it would not easily
bring the troubles in the island to an end. The Epitropi, encouraged and supported
by the Ethnike Hetairia, could not be satisfied with any other solution than the
unification of Crete with Greece. Many Christian deputies in the Cretan Assembly
also possessed such an ulterior desire.12 According to the supporters of union,
execution of reforms under the auspices of the Great Powers was reinforcing the
Ottoman sovereignty over the island and could thwart their goals for a long time to
come.13 On the other hand, the Muslim inhabitants of the island started to worry
that they would eventually be deprived of certain rights that they actually
possessed.14 Therefore, both parties attempted to disrupt the reform process.
Ottoman authorities also delayed the enforcement of reforms in order not to offend
the Muslim Cretans.15 But these procrastinations reduced the level of distrust
among the Christian Cretans towards the existing administration. Gennadis, the
Greek consul-general in Crete, was encouraging the extremist elements among
Christians with the active support of the opposition leaders in Greece.16
Transportation of arms, munitions and volunteers from Greece to the island
continued. Finally, in late-January 1897, armed conflicts broke out again.
11 Great Britain, Turkey No. 8 (1897) Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1897), No. 23.
12 Édouard Driault, Şark Mes’elesi: Bidâyet-i Zuhûrundan Zamanımıza Kadar, translated by Nafiz
(İstanbul: Muhtar Hâlid, 1328), 345.
13 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 94.
14 Adıyeke, 162.
15 Süleyman Kâni İrtem, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Makedonya Meselesi (İstanbul: Temel, 1999), 44.
16 Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 36.
20
At the outbreak of disturbances, the king and government in Greece
portrayed a somewhat neutral attitude and expressed their willingness that
tranquility should be preserved in Crete.17 On 5 February, Deligiannis declared in
the Greek parliament that “at a moment when the Powers are working for the reestablishment
of the operation of the institutions which have been granted to Crete,
Greece has no interest, nor was she in duty bound to interfere, and to present
herself as wanting the union of Crete with Greece.”18 Whether the premier was
sincere in this statement is difficult to know, but an ominous telegram received
from Hanya (Canea) on the very same day led him to make a decision which
contradicted his speech. This telegram, sent by Gennadis, announced with
exaggeration that the Christian Cretans were on the verge of annihilation: “The
Turkish soldiers have given the signal for massacre by shooting from the ramparts
into the town. I have asked the consuls to debark marines to save what is possible;
the consuls have refused. No hope. The Christians of the town will all be
massacred.”19
The Greek government could not remain inactive upon these news, which
caused great uneasiness in Athens. Two warships of the Greek navy were
dispatched to the island immediately.20 Alexandros Skouzes, the Greek minister of
foreign affairs, informed the Great Powers that sending of these vessels was for the
sole purpose of “succoring the suffering,”21 but this action was most likely intended
to test the standpoint of the Great Powers in the crisis. Although it was generally
17 Papadopoulos, 116.
18 Great Britain, Turkey No. 11 (1897) Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete and the War
between Turkey and Greece (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1897) (henceforth
abbreviated as Turkey No. 11), No. 36.
19 Langer, 357; İrtem, 45; Tatsios, 91. Colonel Herbert Chermside reported to the British
government on 5 February that the responsibility of the Cretan Christians for the disorders was at
least equal to that of the Muslims and the conduct of the Ottoman troops had been well. After
receiving these reports, the Marquess of Salisbury, the prime minister and foreign secretary of
Britain, concluded that the intelligence furnished to the Greek government was exaggerated: Turkey
No. 11, No. 13.
20 Turkey No. 11, No. 54, 55. The captain of Hydra, one of these two warships, refused to salute the
Ottoman flag at the port of Hanya until the British consul urged him to do so on the following day:
Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 102.
21 Turkey No. 11, No. 54; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/42.
21
known that they desired to maintain the general peace and would not easily tolerate
an audacious attempt by Greece, the Powers had a general idea that the
misgovernment of the sultan was the primary cause of the troubles in Crete.
Furthermore, any support by the Greeks to their Christian “brethren” in Crete
would doubtlessly be praised and supported by the European public opinion. Under
these circumstances, how the Powers would react to the involvement of Greece in
the Cretan crisis was somewhat uncertain.
The dispatch of Greek warships to the Cretan waters was protested by the
Great Powers as, on the one hand, increasing the excitement among the Greek
public, and, on the other hand, inducing the Ottoman government to take countermeasures.
22 But the opposition of the Powers did not go further and neither their
representatives in Athens, nor their consuls in Crete made an effective effort for the
withdrawal of the dispatched vessels. The apparent indifference of the Great
Powers encouraged the Greek government to send further naval units, carrying
volunteers, weapons and munitions, to the island.23 Protestations by the Ottoman
government were evaded with the allegation that the vessels were being sent only
for humanitarian purposes.24
Yet neither the public in Greece nor the Cretan Christians were satisfied
with the steps taken by the Greek government. The public, already agitated by the
telegram of Gennadis, became totally infuriated by fabricated reports and stories
published in newspapers.25 Hostile demonstrations against the Ottoman Empire
were organized in Athens and the provinces.26 Encouraged by the warlike
atmosphere in Greece, the Ethnike Hetairia published a long and excessively
fervent proclamation, calling their “Cretan brethren” to fight for the union of Crete
with their “Hellenic motherland.”27 Cretan insurgents responded to this invitation
22 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 30, 47.
23 Adıyeke, 166; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/56.
24 Turkey No. 11, No. 28.
25 Turkey No. 11, No. 35.
26 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/56; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/58.
27 Turkey No. 11, No. 64; Langer, 357.
22
positively by hoisting the Greek flag, declaring union with Greece and appealing to
King George to take possession of the island.28
The proceedings were developing quite rapidly and neither the Ottoman
Empire nor the Great Powers was able to respond on time. Although the Ottomans
were alarmed at the intelligence coming from Greece and Crete, they did not want
to take unilateral action while the reforms in the island were still being carried out.
Instead, the Sublime Porte requested on 8 February from the Great Powers to
“either urge the Greek government to withdraw their navy from Crete, or let the
Imperial government undertake the measures necessitated by the incidents.”29 What
the Powers did in response was to repeat their advice of peace to the Greek
government and authorize their admirals in the Cretan waters to prevent an
aggressive action by Greek vessels.30 Although none of them was willing to take
the initiative, the Powers were anxious to avert a Greek attempt to annex Crete, as
it was almost certain that such an annexation would pave the way for
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and generate the danger of a general war in
Europe.31
3. 3. The Greek Decision of Intervention
Facing on the one hand the warnings by Europe to respect peace, and the
internal pressure for aggression on the other, the Greek government found itself in
a difficult position. Since the government was not completely decided on the policy
it should follow, its declarations and actions oscillated between these two
alternatives for some time. On 10 February, when a number of Greek vessels,
including armed torpedo boats, were still in the Cretan waters, Deligiannis was still
28 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/13; Langer, 358.
29 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/13.
30 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 43, 44, 57.
31 Turkey No. 11, No. 90.
23
trying to calm down the supporters of war with a long speech he gave in the Greek
parliament:
... The entire Greek population throughout the world also desires that
Crete should be united to Greece. But, in fact, this desire contradicts with
the international law; since none of the treaties of 1830, 1856 and 1878
has placed the island under the sovereignty of the king of Greece… Thus,
we have to be careful about not being pushed by our dreams, which have
deviated from reality, and prefer a moderate policy towards Crete…We
are aware that the Muslims of the island have been working to annihilate
the Christian population there… But the Cretan question is persisting and
it will surely have different dimensions in the future. I can assure you that
in any case the government will not hesitate to undertake its
responsibilities; and, if required, it will act in the boldest way possible…
Therefore, I advise you to be patient and criticize our government if our
policy proves wrong in the end.32
No matter how these words were intended as a response to criticisms by the
opposition towards the apparent lethargy of the Greek government, the speech of
Deligiannis in fact gave the signals of a prospective enterprise for the annexation of
Crete. After some time of testing the resoluteness of the Great Powers for peace,
and the Greek public, the Ethnike Hetairia and the opposition for aggression, the
premier had finally realized that it was almost impossible for him to resist the
overwhelming pressure coming from the latter. The opposition, led by Dimitrios
Rallis, had long been blaming the government and the king for missing the
opportunity to occupy Crete during the conflicts in 1896.33 The mob, stimulated by
the warlike propagandas of the Ethnike Hetairia, had become the actual ruling
power at Athens.34 The positions of the king and the government would be in
danger if the crisis in Crete was concluded without any material gain for Greece.
Alternatively, while opposing demands of the public was extremely difficult, the
Great Powers could possibly be brought to terms, as their dread of a general war
might induce them to concede the Greek claims.35 In this respect, defying the
32 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/107; Turkey No. 11, No. 122.
33 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 364/10.
34 Turkey No. 11, No. 90.
35 Bartlett, 15.
24
Powers and the Ottoman Empire instead of its public seemed to be the most
preferable strategy to the Greek government.
Under these circumstances, the rumors that the Sublime Porte was preparing
reinforcements to be used in Crete impelled the Greek government to act hastily.
The Ottoman government had withdrawn a substantial portion of its forces from
the island when the reforms began to be carried out,36 and the circumstances at that
moment were optimal for an audacious move on Crete. Arrival of new Ottoman
troops could make such a move totally unfeasible. Thus, on 10 February, the same
day that Deligiannis gave his speech in the parliament, a fleet under the command
of Prince George was sent to Crete.37 On the following day, Skouzes formally
declared to the Great Powers that Greece could no longer remain passive to the
proceedings and Crete should be liberated from Ottoman sovereignty.38 He also did
not hesitate to tell Count Szechenyi, the Austro-Hungarian chargé d’affaires in
Athens, that “Greece would sooner raise a general conflagration by means of her
large communities at Constantinople and all over the East than yield in the matter
of Crete.”39 On 13 February, the Greek iron-clad Miaoulis opened fire on an
Ottoman steam-yacht Fuad and increased the tension in the Cretan waters even
further.40
The final and most striking move of the Greek government came about on
the same day. A military force of approximately 1,400 soldiers,41 under the
command of Colonel Timoleon Vassos, was sent to Crete with the following
instructions:
… Landing with the troops under your command on Crete and in a proper
locality, you will, in the name of the King of the Hellenes, George I,
occupy the island, driving away the Turks from the forts, and taking
36 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/13.
37 Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 349; Turkey No. 11, No. 39. The fleet arrived to the Cretan waters on 13
February.
38 Turkey No. 11, No. 59.
39 Turkey No. 11, No. 68.
40 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 112-113.
41 H. A. Lawrence, The Greco-Turkish War 1897, quoted in Papadopoulos, 258; Turkey No. 11, No.
71.
25
possession of them. Every action that you will take you will base upon
the established Hellenic laws in the name of the King and under the
responsibility of the Hellenic Government. As soon as you land you will
issue a Proclamation concerning the occupation.42
The dispatch of Greek troops in Crete internationalized the Cretan crisis,
which had initially been a local problem within the Ottoman Empire. By attempting
to occupy a foreign territory without declaration of war, Greece was not only
breaching international law, but also threatening stability in the Near East and
Balkans. Therefore, the representatives of the Great Powers in Athens immediately
presented to the Greek government a memorandum, declaring that “in the event of
its being true that the regular troops are under orders to effect an armed landing on
a point of the Ottoman Empire, we consider it our duty…to dwell upon the
disapprobation which such a proceeding will meet with from all our
Governments…”43 The memorandum was answered on the same day by the Greek
foreign minister that the Greek government, which could no longer endure the
lamentable condition of the Cretans, as it was bound to them by “sacred ties and
religion,” decided to occupy the island and restore peace and order there.44 Prince
George tried to justify the decision of the Greek government by claiming that the
Cretan insurgents would not surrender their arms to the Great Powers or to Turkey,
but to Greece alone.45 Deligiannis explained this incident to Asım Bey by alleging
that his government was forced to send troops to Crete by the pressure of public
opinion and the dispatched ships were only charged to sail round the island.46
However, in the Greek parliament, he did not hesitate to declare that since Crete
was henceforth a part of Greece, a draft of law for the island would shortly be
prepared.47
42 Tatsios, 200; Turkey No. 11, No. 139.
43 Turkey No. 11, No. 69.
44 Turkey No. 11, No. 70.
45 Turkey No. 11, No. 82.
46 Turkey No. 11, No. 78.
47 Vecîhî, et al., 70.
26
While dispatching naval and military forces to Crete, the Greek government
also set about to summon classes of reservists to the colors to be sent into
Thessaly.48 This might be a defensive measure commenced with the anticipation
that the Ottomans could declare war on Greece after the occupation of Crete. But
the Greek nationalists believed that it was the right time to take the offensive
against the Ottoman Empire. A secret society in Athens, which called itself “the
Bloody Committee,” was inciting the Greeks, living both inside and outside
Greece, to unite for war by delivering the following proclamation:
The time for salvaging the honor of the Greeks, who have been
overwhelmed with wickedness, has come. The nation must shake off the
innumerable disgraces, to which they have been subjected for a long
time, and rise up. Let us rise up altogether. Let us get ready to fulfill
every kind of sacrifice. Let us decide on freeing our nation from the
stains of evil and disgrace with the blood-floods of an honorable
war…The king, the prime minister, the leader of opposition, ministers,
members of the parliament and owners of wealth: Unite for this
movement as it will direct you to fame and honor…War, war again, and
war forever!49
Through its agencies across Europe, the Ethnike Hetairia had already been carrying
on propaganda and collecting money for its cause. Some European press was
subsidized for writing fabricated stories about atrocities suffered by the Christians
in Crete.50 The members of the Ethnike Hetairia expected that in case of war
between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, a large mass of volunteers would come
from Europe and fight alongside the Greek army.51 They also hoped to inflame a
large-scale conflagration within the Ottoman lands, by provoking the Christians
living in Epirus, Macedonia, Albania, and even in İstanbul, and thus to turn the
European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire once more.52
48 Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 349; H. A. Lawrence, quoted in Papadopoulos, 258.
49 BOA, Y.PRK.TKM., 37/59.
50 Hans Barth, Türk Savun Kendini, translated by Selçuk Ünlü (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları
Vakfı, 1988), 50-51.
51 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 231.
52 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/43; Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 349.
27
CHAPTER 4
THE ROAD TO WAR
4. 1. The First Reactions to the Greek Occupation of Crete
4. 1. 1. The Ottoman Empire
The latest incidents were certainly enough to be declared casus belli by the
Ottoman Empire. But, fearing the possible repercussions of a direct military
confrontation, particularly in Balkan affairs, the Ottomans decided not to sever
diplomatic relations with Greece at once, but to expect a solution through the
channel of Europe.1 Accordingly, the Sublime Porte immediately requested the
Great Powers to “intervene in the most energetic manner, and, if necessary, by
coercive measures,” or at least allow the Ottomans apply appropriate measures for
the resolution of the incidents.2 On 14 February, Tevfik Paşa, the Ottoman minister
of foreign affairs, met Alexander Nelidov and Sir Philip Currie, the Russian and
British ambassadors in İstanbul, and discussed rumors that the Greek government
was planning to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. The ambassadors eased the
minister’s concerns by indicating that Prince George and his troops had not landed
on the island yet, and the Great Powers would never allow a massive Greek
1 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 361-362.
2 BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20; Turkey No. 11, No. 78.
28
military force to land in Crete. Yet the Russian ambassador still advised him to be
cautious about an attempt by Greek irregulars to infiltrate the Thessalian border.3
Nevertheless, the situation was too grave for the Ottomans to be completely
entrusted to the good offices of the Great Powers. Especially the possibility of a
Greek uprising in Epirus and Macedonia induced the Ottoman government to take
military measures. To what extent the advice of Nelidov was influential is difficult
to determine; but on the very same day with the abovementioned meeting, the
sultan issued an imperial decree which formed an army of 140 battalions, 27
squadrons and 36 artillery batteries, and attached to this force the fortification and
pontooning companies at Üsküb (Skopje) as well as the telegram company and the
transportation battalion at Manastır. The regular troops (nizamiyye) of this army
would depart immediately to Yanya (Janina) and Alasonya, which were
respectively on the Epirote and Thessalian side of the Greek frontier, while the
reservists (redif) would be sent to these locations following conscription.4
The mobilized forces constituted roughly one-fourth of the whole Ottoman
army. In spite of the precarious political and financial situation of the empire,
caused by the recent Armenian uprisings, the Ottoman government did not hesitate
to undertake such an onerous activity. In his book, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz
did not conceal his surprise about the success of the campaign by indicating that
the mobilization of the Ottoman army was fulfilled by an amount of money which
was equal to the daily expenses of the German army in expedition.5
The Sublime Porte tried to justify the mobilization of the Ottoman army by
declaring that “the presence of raw levies and bands of brigands in Thessaly
necessitated precautionary measures of a defensive character.”6 Although the Great
Powers kept requesting insistently from the Porte not to dispatch additional troops
3 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 55/57.
4 BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/821; Sun, 280.
5 Goltz Paşa [Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz], Osmanlı-Yunan Seferi (1313-1897), translated by
Yakub Şevkî (İstanbul: Mekteb-i Fünûn-i Harbiyye-i Osmânî Matbaası, 1326), 9-11.
6 Clive Bigham, With the Turkish Army in Thessaly (London: Macmillan and Co., 1897), 2.
29
to Crete,7 the military preparations on the Greek border did not cause any
resistance in Europe. Foreign ministers of the Powers later responded that these
preparations were a rightful activity of self-defense and would not be objected
unless the Ottomans executed a preemptive attack.8
4. 1. 2. The Great Powers
News that the Greek government was sending land forces to Crete alarmed
the European cabinets. In spite of the sympathy of the Christian public opinion, as
well as Queen Victoria of Britain and Czar Nicholas II of Russia, who had kinship
with the dynasty in Greece, to the Greek cause, the governments in Europe were
exceedingly careful to avert a new international crisis.9
In Britain, although the queen, the opposition and the public had phil-
Hellenic tendencies, the British cabinet did not regard supporting Greece in its
attempt as a prudent policy. This is because, some of the Great Powers clearly
condemned the Greek enterprise over Crete and it was clear that they could not be
easily convinced to intervene in the crisis in favor of Greece. Under these
circumstances, an isolated support by Britain to the insurgence in Crete would be to
quarrel with the other Great Powers, which would disturb the European Concert.10
Moreover, if the hostility of the Greeks were rewarded by Europe, that would
surely encourage the other Christian elements in the Balkans to obtain similar
concessions through aggression. Such a situation, creating new disputes between
the Powers, could lead to serious complications in Europe, possibly to a general
war. With these calculations, Salisbury declared the Greek expedition to Crete as
“a most ill-advised act” and preserved the intention to resolve the crisis in
agreement with the other Powers.11 The first reactions of Gabriel Hanotaux and
7 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/78; BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20.
8 BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20.
9 Langer, 360-361.
10 Papadopoulos, 117.
11 Langer, 361-362; Papadopoulos, 120.
30
Emilio Visconti-Venosta, the foreign ministers of France and Italy respectively, to
the incident also advocated collective action by the Powers to prevent an Ottoman-
Greek war.12
A military conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was not
desirable for Austria-Hungary and Russia as they feared that the war could provoke
the other states in the Balkans and create serious complications there. Although
both of these Powers had long regarded the Balkans as a potential area of
enlargement, neither was disposed to actively engage in the affairs of the region at
that time due to several reasons. Austria-Hungary was suffering acute internal
difficulties which hardly allowed any international adventurism.13 Especially the
recent refusal of the British government to renew the Mediterranean Agreements,
which had somewhat worked as a guarantee for the territorial integrity of Austria-
Hungary since 1887, made the Austrians anxious to preserve the balances in the
Near East and Balkans. The Russians, on the other hand, were concerned primarily
with the problems of East Asia, so they were as eager as the Austrians to maintain
stability in the Near East and Balkans, at least for a certain period of time.14
The strongest opposition to the dispatch of Greek troops to Crete came from
Germany. In Berlin, Emperor Wilhelm II reacted to the news by expressing that
“the reply to this should be the dispatch of cannons to the Piraeus.” He believed
that the foolhardiness of Greece, which could precipitate fresh troubles in Greece,
Macedonia, Eastern Anatolia as well as İstanbul, had to be punished by the Powers.
Europe should not, according to him, allow the landing of Greek forces on the
island while persistently impeding the dispatch of reinforcements by the Ottoman
government.15 The emperor addressed to Frank C. Lascelles, the British
12 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 83, 87.
13 Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), 261.
14 Barbara Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 210; Norman R. Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914 (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1992), 335; Langer, 362.
15 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 354.
31
ambassador in Berlin, a proposal to blockade the Piraeus as early as 14 February.16
Although the attitude of the German government did not match the outburst of the
emperor at the beginning,17 the idea of an international blockade of the Piraeus
soon became the central element of German policy concerning the crisis between
Greece and the Ottoman Empire.
Friedrich von Holstein, an influential statesman in the German Foreign
Office, had long believed that Britain would prefer to see a continental war in
Europe, which would secure its presence in Africa and Asia. Therefore he strongly
endeavored to promote the desires of Russia and Austria-Hungary for preserving
the status-quo by gaining the support of Italy and, if possible, France. Although the
existing crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire seemed to be a local one, it
had to be contained before growing into a war which could stimulate rivalries
among the Great Powers. With these considerations, the German government
assured the Russian government that any Russian proposal designed to maintain
peace would be supported by Germany and recommended to Austrian and Italian
cabinets, for their approval, as well.18 In response to this offer, the Russians
prepared a project of landing detachments from various European ships in Crete
and holding the island en depôt (i.e. in trust) until the Powers would agree on a
permanent solution of the Cretan question.19 This project, agreed upon by the other
Great Powers, was conveyed to the Sublime Porte and the admirals of the Powers
in the Cretan waters. In İstanbul, a special commission of ministers (Encümen-i
Mahsus-i Vükelâ) immediately issued the permission that a certain number of
soldiers that belonged to the naval forces of the Great Powers could be
disembarked on Crete.20 On 15 February, 450 marines (100 each from the British,
16 Turkey No. 11, No. 82; German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, selected and translated by
Edgar Trevelyan S. Dugdale (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969), 2: XII. 327.
17 Norman R. Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and
Wilhelm II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 2: 480.
18 Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, 2: 478.
19 Turkey No. 11, No. 76; Papadopoulos, 118.
20 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/21.
32
French, Russian and Italian ships and 50 from Austria-Hungary) were landed in
Hanya.21 Assuming the temporary protection of the town, the admirals declared to
the local government and leaders of the rebels that:
After summoning in the SS Sicily, under the presidency of Vice Admiral
Canevaro, the admirals and captains of the European naval forces decided
to put Crete under the control of the Great Powers by landing marines on
every city in the island. This decision will be communicated to the
command of the Greek fleet and the commander will be invited to abstain
from any military action on the island. The marines will defend the island
in case of attack or harassment. Greek troops will be arrested
immediately if they are found in the island. The Great Powers announce
that appropriate measures will be taken for the benefit of the both
communities living in the island and declare that it is necessary for
everyone to leave the arms in order to gain the goodwill of Europe.22
On the same day, another declaration was made in Crete; but this one was
addressed to the whole Cretan community. Upon landing with his troops near
Hanya, Colonel Vassos issued the following proclamation, which had been
delivered to him by the Greek government:
…This lamentable condition of a people of the same race and religion,
who have the same destiny and history as ourselves, could no longer be
tolerated. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, my august Master,
decided to put an end to this state of things by the military occupation of
the island…Without distinction of religion or nationality, I promise, in
the name of His Majesty, that I will protect the honor, life and property of
the inhabitants, respect their religious convictions, and bring them peace
and equal justice.23
4. 2. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 1
The Greek government having landed in Crete an operating force, and the
admirals having put the island under their control, a double duty was imposed on
Europe on avoiding mutual aggression between the Christian and Muslim Cretans,
and preventing a conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece.24 Germany still
21 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 348; Tatsios, 95. German detachments were landed only after the arrival
of S.M.S. Kaiserin Augusta to Crete on 21 February: German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 319.
22 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/91.
23 Turkey No. 11, No. 168; Tatsios, 201.
24 L’Italie, Italian daily, 21 February 1897, quoted in Turkey No. 11, No. 173.
33
insisted that Wilhelm’s project of blockading Greek ports would be the best
remedy for both complications. Contrary to the general supposition, neither love of
the Ottomans, nor despise towards the Greeks was a motivation for the Germans.
The project of blockade was actually designed to prevent an action by not only the
Greek but also the Ottoman side. On 17 February, Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-
Schillingsfürst, the German chancellor, articulated the rationale of the project to the
Powers as follows:
For the purpose of depriving the Greek Government of the conviction -
which is the foundation of its actions- that, in case of need, it can rely on
the support of certain of the Powers, and, on the other hand, of removing
the alternative -either that the Turkish Government accepts the challenge
to fight, or that Mussulman fanaticism seizes the opportunity for a rising
with incalculable results- the individual measures…are insufficient. If the
Powers seriously desire to avoid an outbreak, they will be forced in their
joint action to strike harder and closer to the center of the Greek
movement…25
The German proposal was supported by the Russian government, which
strongly denounced the presence of an armed Greek force in Crete. Mikhail
Nikolayevich Muravyov, the foreign minister of Russia, regarded the action by the
Greek government almost as a declaration of war to the Great Powers.26 Thus, he
informed the German government that Russia was ready to participate in an
energetic measure to be carried out collectively by the fleets of the Powers against
Greece.27 Austria-Hungary was also sympathetic to the blockade of the Piraeus.
But the opinions of these three governments were not enough for a
collective action by the Powers, especially when the British government was not
willing to make such a commitment. First of all, when the British cabinet had
prevented him, in 1885, from implementing a pro-active policy upon the Sublime
Porte concerning the Armenian matters, Salisbury had decided to place secondary
importance to the ‘Eastern Question.’28 But, thanks to the Cretan crisis, Britain had
25 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 329.
26 BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20.
27 Turkey No. 11, No. 135.
28 J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century
(London: The Athlone Press, 1970), 94; Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 334.
34
been dragged once more into a dispute between the sultan and his Christian
subjects. The mise en dépôt of Crete was not an insignificant commitment, and the
British government wanted to see some result from that before proceeding to a new
one. Besides, participation of Britain in a coercive measure against Greece would
be perceived as an open support to the sultan, who was constantly being blamed by
the opposition and the public in Britain as the responsible party for the sufferings
of the Christian Cretans. Thus, no matter that he did not approve the daring attempt
of Greece, Salisbury endeavored to appease the Greeks without offending them, as
well as the British public opinion. The best way to achieve this would be
accelerating the process of establishing autonomy in Crete. While the blockade of
their ports could exasperate the Greeks and drive them to advance into
Macedonia;29 decreasing Ottoman authority over Crete would, according to him,
pleasantly induce them to end their campaign in the island.30 Therefore, on 17
February, Salisbury responded to the German proposal of blockade with another
proposal of restructuring the administration of Crete: “It is not possible usefully to
consider [the proposal] until the Powers have resolved upon a course of action as
regards the island of Crete, which is now occupied by them…A strong feeling is
entertained by Her Majesty’s Government that… [Crete] must be converted into a
privileged province of the Empire.”31 According to him, the governor-general of
Crete should be appointed by the Great Powers and he should enjoy considerable
liberty in his decisions. Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador in London, wrote
to his government that Salisbury imagined “a future position for Crete, similar to
that of Bulgaria.”32
While King George and the Greek Government were repeatedly assuring
the representatives of the Powers that Greece would act strictly on the defensive on
29 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 331.
30 Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 350.
31 Turkey No. 11, No. 125; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/90.
32 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 331.
35
the Thessalian border,33 the Greeks kept taking further steps towards annexation of
Crete. Vassos had already ordered his troops, augmented by a massive number of
Cretan insurgents, to occupy the interior of the island, by ignoring all the efforts by
the admirals on the ground that he could not take orders from anybody except his
government.34 On 19 February, Gennadis hoisted a Greek flag at the Greek
consulate in Hanya. The commander of the foreign detachments immediately
protested this action and requested him to haul down the flag.35 On the following
day, a bill was introduced by Skouzes to the Greek parliament for the abolition of
the Greek consulates at Hanya, Kandiye (Candia) and Resmo (Rethymo), which
was incompatible with the new state of affairs that occurred by the Greek
occupation of Crete.36 On the grounds that Crete had ceased to be Ottoman
territory, Gennadis would thence be the royal commissioner of Greece in the
island.37 This defiance produced a strong reaction from the Powers, inducing them
to undertake more effective measures.38 The German government, in particular,
exasperated by the effrontery of the Greeks decided to follow a two-sided strategy.
While pushing for the blockade of the Piraeus in European diplomatic circles,
Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, the German foreign minister, advised the
Ottomans to hasten military preparations that would enable their forces to cross the
Thessalian border if and when necessary. Even if an armed conflict never took
place, he continued, these military preparations and the presence of a large
Ottoman army nearby the border could be advantageous for the Ottomans in
negotiations on Crete.39
Despite the admirals’ unanimous resolution to defeat the insurgents, their
forces were only able to protect the large coastal towns. According to them, the
33 Turkey No. 11, No. 144.
34 Tatsios, 96; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 131-132.
35 Turkey No. 11, No. 172.
36 Turkey No. 11, No. 196; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 174.
37 Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 37.
38 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 350.
39 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/53.
36
crisis could not be resolved unless Greece was persuaded to withdraw its forces
from Crete.40 Yet the lack of consensus among the Powers concerning the measure
to be applied on Greece hindered a collective European action. The Germans,
supported by the Austrians and the Russians, insisted on the blockade of Greek
ports while the British were completely against that. France and Italy were
somewhat reserved, owing much to the phil-Hellene tendencies within their public.
The French government, while being disinclined to support the German idea of
blockade, was still disposed to contribute a collective effort to end the crisis. This
is because, if prolonged, the crisis could cause more serious complications and
France was not ready yet to engage in a major conflict.41 The Italians, on the other
hand, were acting on the principle that they would participate in a measure only if
it was agreed unanimously by the other five Powers.42
When it became clear that neither Germany nor Britain would relinquish
their stiff postures concerning the Cretan affairs, the Russian government assumed
mediation among them. With a telegram, dated 23 February, Muravyov proposed
to the Great Powers two basic principles on which the European policy concerning
Crete to be based henceforth:
1. Crete shall in no case be annexed to Greece under present
circumstances.
2. As Turkey has delayed the application of the reforms agreed upon,
they no longer meet the requirements of the present situation. The Powers
have resolved, while maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to
bestow on Crete an autonomous administration.
According to the proposal, these two points would be communicated to the
Ottoman and Greek governments, and the latter would also be demanded to
withdraw its troops and ships from Crete within three or four days. If this demand
40 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 351.
41 George F. Abbott, Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers (London: Robert Scott, 1916), 52;
Turkey No. 11, No. 176; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 180-184.
42 Turkey No. 11, No. 142; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/85.
37
was not complied with, the Powers would “proceed immediately to measures of
extreme rigor.”43
The two articles and the later provisions in the Russian proposal were
evidently designed to satisfy the demands of Britain and Germany, respectively.
The Germans did not raise an objection to the project, possibly owing to the advice
of Count Agenor Goluchowski, the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, to accept
a compromise.44 But, on the following day, the British government responded to
the Russian initiative with an alternative project based on four points. The first
three, i.e. autonomy, Ottoman sovereignty, and communication of the resolution to
the two parties, overlapped with the Russian proposal. The last point was, however,
different as it required the withdrawal of not only Greek, but also Ottoman forces
from Crete: “If either Turkey or Greece persistently refuse, when required, to
withdraw their naval and military forces from the island, the Powers should impose
their decision by force upon the State so refusing.”45 The British government still
kept its caution not to portray an explicit reaction to the Greek expedition to Crete.
According to Salisbury, sending an ultimatum only to Greece, as proposed by
Russia, would create an impression that Britain was willing to restore Ottoman
forces as the masters of Crete.46 But, the Liberal Unionists in the British cabinet,
led by Joseph Chamberlain, a fervent phil-Hellene,47 would never accept any
solution less than the complete autonomy of Crete.48
The British counter-proposal was evaluated and responded to by the other
Powers in a short period of time. All of them raised objections to Point 4 except
Italy, which totally agreed with Britain.49 Hanotaux was also not completely
against the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Crete; but, pointing out the
43 Turkey No. 11, No. 174; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 192.
44 Papadopoulos, 122.
45 Turkey No. 11, No. 178.
46 Turkey No. 11, No. 180.
47 Papadopoulos, 120.
48 Langer, 363.
49 Turkey No. 11, No. 186.
38
vulnerability of Muslim Cretans, he stated that this should be done after the local
gendarmerie in the island was organized by the Powers.50 The German and
Austrian foreign ministers were of the opinion that if the island was to remain
under suzerainty of the sultan, Ottoman forces had the right to be in the island
while the Greek ones did not.51 Muravyov did not express any opinion on whether
the Ottoman forces should stay in Crete or not; but indicated that such a proposal
would cause delay in the negotiations.52
4. 3. Reflections of the Crisis in the Balkan Politics
The negotiations between the Powers went on approximately for a week. In
the meantime, Deligiannis, fearing a unanimous decision of blockade, brazenly
declared that unity existed between the interests of Greece and the Ottoman
Empire, so the problem should be resolved directly between the two states. While
making absolutely no impact on the negotiations held in Europe, this statement
raised hopes in İstanbul for a pacific settlement of the Cretan question. The
Ottoman minister in Athens was instructed immediately to meet Deligiannis and to
communicate to him that the Sublime Porte was ready to halt the military
preparations as long as the Greek government recalled its forces from Crete. But
the minister was not able to obtain a clear answer from the Greek government.53
His reports back to the Porte rather pointed out that big demonstrations about the
Cretan question were being organized in Athens and the level of excitement in the
city was extremely high.54 Meanwhile, Ottoman consuls in Trikkala, Larissa and
Volo were reporting that Muslims who lived in Thessaly were subjected to offenses
and a mass emigration to the Ottoman Empire from the region was to be expected.
50 Turkey No. 11, No. 183.
51 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 184, 185.
52 Turkey No. 11, No. 188.
53 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/60. See Appendix C.
54 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/68.
39
In consequence, Tevfik Paşa sent for the Greek ambassador and asked the
termination of hostile practices in Greece.55
Actually, the real anxiety of the Ottomans was not a military confrontation
with the Greeks, as their armed forces were incomparably superior, in terms of both
quality and quantity, to the Greek army, but a possible inclusion of the other
Balkan states in the conflict. At that time, it was generally believed that the
Macedonian question would soon break out in an acute form, and there was already
an air of preparedness about activity in the Balkans.56 A joint attack by Greece,
Bulgaria and Serbia would obviously be disastrous for the Ottoman presence in
Europe, while a minor defeat of the Ottoman army might cause serious
complications within the internal affairs of the empire, including a revolution.
These considerations were the underlying factor in the decision of the Ottoman
government to mobilize a massive military force, which was more than enough to
overcome the Greek army.57
The apprehension of the Ottomans about the Balkans was not unfounded.
The escalation of crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire excited both the
Bulgarian and Serbian governments greatly with the calculation that any advantage
to be obtained by Greece would mean a change in the regional balances at their
expense.58 At the beginning, the Bulgarians had the idea of benefiting from the
crisis. With an implicit threat of mobilization, they demanded from the Ottoman
Empire establishment of a synod, with five Bulgarian priests, in İstanbul59 as well
as appointment of Bulgarian metropolitans and commercial agents to certain towns
in Macedonia.60 Yet the sultan constantly evaded putting these demands into the
55 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/49.
56 Papadopoulos, 113.
57 Goltz Paşa, 21-22.
58 Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, translated by İhsan Catay (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Y.,
1996), 133.
59 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/48.
60 Realizing that the autonomy of Macedonia was a remote accomplishment, the Bulgarian
government had begun to make inroads to acquire berats from the sultan for the establishment of
Bulgarian sees in Melnik, Kılkış (Kukush), Ustrumca (Strumica), Debre (Debar) and Manastır, as
well as appointment of Bulgarian commercial agents to Selânik, Üsküb, Manastır, Dedeağaç and
40
agenda by pointing out the financial and political difficulties he had to handle
first.61
In order to double the effectiveness of its efforts, the Bulgarian government
also initiated rapprochement with Greece. In January 1897, a Bulgarian legation
was opened in Athens, and Konstantin Stoilov, the Bulgarian premier, suggested
the Greek government to exert pressure on the Sublime Porte jointly with the
demand of reforms in Macedonia. The Greek government, envisaging the partition
of the region, did not accept this idea.62 Nevertheless, the Greeks would love to see
Bulgaria, and also Serbia, fighting on their side against the Ottoman army. If they
assured the help of these two states, the Greeks contemplated, with the support of
irregulars trained by the Ethnike Hetairia, they could overcome the Ottomans and
obtain not only Crete; but also Epirus and a part of Macedonia.63 The Ottomans
were also aware that a coalition of these three states could set the entire Macedonia
in flames. Bulgarian revolutionary committees had already begun to operate in the
region64 and, after its annexation of Eastern Rumelia, a further move by Bulgaria
on Macedonia was predictable. Since the military transportation was carried out by
land, an armed attack from Bulgaria could put the Ottoman army in a difficult
position.65 As a measure against an aggression from the Bulgarian side, Hâfız
Mehmed Bey, the governor of Kosova, advised the Porte that military forces in
towns that were close to the Bulgarian border and mostly inhabited by Bulgarians,
such as Palanka, İştib, Osmaniyye, Koçana and Kratova should not be removed,
but reinforced even further.66 The Ottoman government frequently sent orders to
Edirne: Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878-1918: A History (Boulder: East European
Monographs, 1983), 234-235.
61 Veska Nikolova, “La Bulgarie et les pays voisins pendant la Guerre gréco-turque (1897),” in
Bulgarian Historical Review 9: 4 (1981): 28.
62 Crampton, 234-235; Nikolova, 31; Tatsios, 108-109.
63 Tatsios, 107; Bartlett, 23; Bigham, 1.
64 1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve Muhâberâtı (İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi,
Türkçe Yazmalar, No: 9919), 44.
65 Tahsin Paşa, Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşa’nın Yıldız Hatıraları (İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1990),
68.
66 BOA, Y.PRK.UM., 36/107.
41
the army commands at Edirne and Selânik that every measure should be taken
against a Bulgarian assault, especially when the transfer of military forces was still
in progress.67
As regards Serbia, a report sent from the legation in Belgrade on 23
February increased fears in İstanbul. Ahmed Tevfik, the Ottoman minister, wrote
that although King Aleksandar Obrenović pledged that Serbia, in case of war
between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, would remain strictly neutral, Serbian
people, along with a number of politicians, were harshly criticizing the friendly
policy of the king towards the sultan. They were extremely disturbed to see that
this policy had never yielded any positive result for Serbia while Bulgaria and
Greece had acquired certain concessions through hostility. The preceding
expectation of the Serbians was the reopening of Serbian schools in Macedonia and
appointment of a Serbian metropolitan there. The minister strongly advised his
government to resolve these questions as soon as possible to avert hostilities by
Serbia, and added that “faced with the threat of Bulgarian committees, driving the
Serbians towards at least neutrality is vital for our security in the Balkans.”68 The
sultan, reluctant to accept the Serbian demands, intended to sign a military
convention with this state.69 But this intention was not materialized.
While the Ottoman suspicions towards Bulgaria and Serbia remained alive,
these two states came to an understanding on a common policy towards the
Ottoman-Greek crisis and the Macedonian affairs. When its attempt to cooperate
with Greece fell through, the Bulgarian government turned its face to Serbia. The
Serbian government, as well as the king, was already willing to reconcile
differences with Bulgaria, as Serbia was not ready to engage in a conflict at that
time. At the end of February, Aleksandar visited Sofia and concluded a secret
agreement with Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria. According to Article 2 of this
67 1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve Muhâberâtı, 57.
68 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/15.
69 Langer, 367.
42
agreement, neither of the parties should engage in a unilateral action which could
upset the status quo in the Balkans. Article 3 stipulated cooperation in religious and
educational issues concerning Macedonia.70
4. 4. The Verbal Note of 2 March: The First Diplomatic Effort by the Powers
Towards the end of February, the Great Powers were also at the brink of an
agreement, concerning the measure to be applied in Crete. As it was clear that the
aforementioned proposal of Britain, stipulating synchronized removal of Greek and
Ottoman troops from the island, would not be supported by the other governments,
the British did not stick to this idea as strictly as before. Actually, there were
certain signals that Continental Powers could initiate drastic measures without
waiting the consent of Britain.71 Thus, Britain turned to the Russian proposal,
which had already been declared as acceptable by the other Powers. With the desire
to reduce the pressure on the Greek government, Salisbury suggested the Russians
to submit an “official summons” to Greece rather than an “ultimatum,” to remove
the phrases “immediately” and “extreme rigor,” both depicting the future measures
to be applied if Greece rejected the summons, from the proposal, and to extend the
allowed delay of the Greek reply to six days.72 All of the suggestions were accepted
by Russia and the British were finally convinced. The two points in the Russian
proposal was communicated to the cabinets of İstanbul and Athens on 2 March as a
verbal note. In addition, the latter was summoned to recall its naval and military
forces from Crete within a period of six days, and notified that the Powers would
resort to coercive measures if the summons was not complied with.73
On the other hand, a diluted version of the British proposal, stipulating the
withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Crete, was prepared by the ambassadors in
70 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 26/45; Adanır, 133; Crampton, 234; Langer, 367-368; Tatsios, 108-109.
71 Papadopoulos, 122-123.
72 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 192, 212.
73 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 361.
43
İstanbul on 1 March, as a memorandum to be appended to the verbal note.
According to this document, as soon as the island was evacuated by the Greek
troops, Ottoman troops in Crete would be concentrated in the fortified places which
were occupied by European detachments at that time. After receiving approval
from their governments, the ambassadors submitted this additional memorandum to
the Sublime Porte on 5 March.74
4. 4. 1. The Ottoman Response to the Verbal Note
While submitting these communications, the ambassadors repeatedly
requested the Ottomans to restrain the Muslim Cretans from committing hostilities
against the Christians, to act with extreme caution on the Greek border and
especially not to utilize local paramilitary troops (başıbozuk) in Macedonia against
the Christians. The Ottomans were already committed not to engage in any
adventurism and to follow the advices by the Powers with maximum care. This is
because, at a time when the Great Powers were, at least in appearance, intervening
in the crisis on the side of the Ottomans, any single act of hostility by Muslims
against Christians, either in Crete or in the border, would infuriate the Europeans
and might result in a volte-face on their policy. The fragility of the situation
imposed the ironically bothersome task of containing its subjects against a mass of
merciless insurgents in Crete, while endeavoring to defend its border against
infiltrations and attacks of irregulars with an extreme control on its own troops.
Both the sultan and the government did their best to perform this task. Numerous
categorical orders were sent to the army commands at Yanya and Alasonya that no
action that could breach the peace should be occasioned.75 With an imperial decree
dated 23 February, employment of paramilitary troops was also banned. On 2
March, the Council of Ministers decided to apply serious and vigorous measures to
74 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 224, 282.
75 BOA, Y.MTV., 151/191; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/79; 1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve
Muhâberâtı, 73.
44
influence the Muslim Cretans not to engage in any activity that could “threaten the
security on the island and expand the difficulties in foreign policy.”76
The reply of the Ottomans to the verbal note of the Great Powers was
totally in accordance with this pacific policy. With a verbal note, dated 6 March,
the Sublime Porte declared its desire of insuring the maintenance of peace and
accepted the autonomy of Crete in principle, assuming the right of discussion with
the ambassadors on the form and details of the administration to be established in
the island.77 Yet the Ottomans did not respond the additional memorandum of 5
March immediately, since a positive response to this document entailed a serious
commitment. Before making such a commitment they rather preferred to see the
course of events, especially to determine the attitude of the Greek government as
well as the resolution of Europe. On March 14, when it was realized that the
collective effort by the Great Powers was still far away from yielding a concrete
result, the Sublime Porte replied to the memorandum by stating that the
concentration of Ottoman troops was a matter to be discussed after the withdrawal
of Greek forces from the island.78
4. 4. 2. The Greek Response to the Verbal Note
In Europe, it was generally believed that the resolution of the Powers,
which was observable in the verbal note of 2 March, would induce the Greeks to
act in a reasonable way,79 but this belief shortly proved wrong. The Greek
government responded to the verbal note of the Powers on 8 March, which was the
last day of the allowed period, with a long reply. Although, the reply stated, the
Greek government totally shared the desire of the Great Powers to preserve general
76 BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/825.
77 Turkey No. 11, No. 246; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 213; Vecîhî, et al., 99.
78 Great Britain, Turkey No. 6 (1897) Reply of the Turkish Government to the Note Presented on
March 5, 1897 by the Representatives of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy,
and Russia, in regard to Crete (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1897).
79 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 212.
45
peace and had the willingness to help this cause, it could not be indifferent to the
perpetual sufferings of the Cretans, who shared the same race, religion and sect
with the Greek people. With the alleged justification that those troops were
working for the same goal with the forces of the Great Powers in Crete, the Greek
government requested the Powers to “reconsider their persistence” concerning the
withdrawal of Greek troops from the island:
Even if the operation of the naval forces of the Great Powers in the
Cretan waters and their determination to prevent landing of Ottoman
troops may render the presence of the Greek vessels needless; the Greek
army should remain in the island for securing the peace and tranquility…
In fact, if the duty of reinstalling peace and security is entrusted to our
troops in the island, which deserve the full trust and confidence of the
Great Powers, the desires of the Powers will be satisfied promptly and
fully.
In its reply, the Greek government also rejected the autonomy to be granted to
Crete:
We have no doubt that the new type of administration, planned by the
Great Powers…shall never be able to restore peace and tranquility in the
island; nor can it terminate the current hostilities… Thus, we would be
under a big culpability if we did not request the Great Powers to
relinquish their insistence for the establishment of autonomy in Crete; but
to return the island, which was actually a part of Greece during the
presidency of Kapodistrias –at the time when the other Greek provinces
obtained their independence-, to Greece.
In accordance with these views, it was proposed, at the end of the note, that after
the restoration of order in Crete, the future of the island should be determined by
the free will of the inhabitants.80
It is obvious in the reply of Greece that the Greeks were truly optimistic that
they could influence the Powers by carrying out a stiff and aggressive policy. The
Greeks did not want the establishment of autonomy in Crete as they feared that if
the Cretans once tasted the delights of self-government, their pan-Hellenic
tendencies would vanish.81 With the presuppositions that the Ottoman Empire was
80 BOA, Y.MTV., 152/15; BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/54; Turkey No. 11, No. 252; Driault and
Lhéritier, 4: 366; Tatsios, 97; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 214-218.
81 Bartlett, 15.
46
a powerless state on the verge of disintegration, that the Powers would not allow
the breach of the Concert because of an Ottoman-Greek conflict, and that public
opinion throughout Europe mostly supported the Greek cause -it was at least
against the sultan-, the Greeks believed that Greece could annex Crete through an
ostensible challenge against both the Ottoman Empire and Europe.82 In February,
excitement of the masses had spread to the government. Deligiannis and Colonel
Metaxas, the minister of war, appeared quite sympathetic towards war against the
Ottoman Empire.83 Especially the former was openly “pandering” to the
nationalistic and warlike sentiments of the Greek populace.84 Even the king, who
had been known as a pacific figure, was signaling that he would not be a mediator
between his public and the Powers anymore. He openly declared that he was
resolute to accomplish the annexation Crete, and the Powers should regard this as a
natural right of Greece, similar to the occupation of Cyprus by Britain, Schleswig-
Holstein by Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.85
Although his subjects were delighted with the attitude of King George;
whether he really believed that Europe would allow Greece to annex Crete was
rather questionable. The king’s pan-Hellenist expressions can well be attributed to
his concerns with domestic politics. Since the actual intervention of the Powers, the
Greek public had been advocating the idea of fighting the Ottomans in the north if
they were not allowed to do that in Crete.86 On 13 March, the French minister in
Athens wrote to his government that “it is impossible to ignore the intensity of the
national feeling which directs everyone towards the border. Such a feeling has not
been observed in Greece since the War of Independence.”87 In addition, the Ethnike
Hetairia, which had become powerful enough to be called an imperium in imperio,
82 Tahsin Paşa, 65; Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 336.
83 M. Henri Turot, L'insurrection Crétoise et la Guerre Gréco-Turque (Paris: Librairie Hachette et
Cie, 1898), 94-96.
84 W. Kinnaird Rose, With the Greeks in Thessaly (London: Methuen & Co, 1897), 158.
85 Bartlett, 314; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 363-364; Tatsios, 103.
86 Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 352.
87 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 379.
47
began to intimidate the king by asking either to follow the motion of Hellenism or
leave the throne at once.88 The king was convinced that his choice lay between
going for war and internal revolution.89 Any attempt by the king to stop the
expedition would probably result in an internal chaos in Greece. In this respect, it is
even possible to assume that he supported the warlike overtones in his country with
the expectation that the Powers would eventually intervene and give an end to the
Greek venture in Crete.90
Furthermore, both the government and the king were aware that their
insistent defiance could result in a blockade of their ports by the Powers. Such an
outcome would definitely exasperate the Greek public and voices of the war
supporters would thus increase to a higher pitch. But since the blockade would
render the maritime transportation impossible, transfer of the Greek army to the
Ottoman border would be a difficult and slow process. Expecting a prompt and
decisive move by their government, the Greeks would respond the protraction with
a revolt, which would ensue in the fall of government, and even the deposition of
the king. In order to avert this, the army had to be mobilized as quickly as possible.
In short, both for King George and Deligiannis, pushing the country recklessly
towards an external conflict seemed to be the only way to avoid an internal crisis.91
Since neither had enough courage to counter the stream and tell their people that
Greece was not ready for war,92 they preferred to intimidate the Ottomans and the
Europeans through military preparations and urge them to yield. If their bluff
worked they could obtain Crete, but if it fell through, nobody in Greece could
blame them for being apathetic to the Megale Idea.
Driven on the one hand by irredentist aspirations, and concerns on domestic
politics on the other, the Greek government decided to hasten military preparations
88 Turot, 96-97; Bartlett, 125.
89 Papadopoulos, 126.
90 Joan Haslip, İngiliz Merkezli Şark Politikası ve II. Abdülhamid, translated by Zeki Doğan
(İstanbul: Fener, 1998), 243; Langer, 366.
91 Mille, 171.
92 Abbott, 308.
48
on the Ottoman border. Owing to the fear of a prompt blockade, this decision had
been put into action before the Greek reply to the verbal note of the Powers was
submitted. Thus, military reservists were called out and armed forces began to be
dispatched to Thessaly and Epirus.93 These preparations produced rumors that in
the face of the pressure from the Great Powers to withdraw their troops from Crete,
the Greeks would attack the Ottoman border without an official declaration of
war.94 When the representatives of the Powers in Athens requested an explanation
from the Greek government, Skouzes assured them that Greece would remain
strictly on the defensive, and would not be an element of discord in Europe.95 But
the activities of the Ethnike Hetairia were increasing the tension on the border and
causing a considerable level of apprehension on the Ottoman side.
4. 5. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 2
The Greek reply to their verbal note was regarded by the European cabinets
as a blatant defiance. Apart from the furious reactions by the German, Russian and
Austrian foreign ministers, Hanotaux believed that the reply included certain
unacceptable terms, and its ulterior object was to separate the Powers.96 But
Salisbury was still trying to find a way to resolve the crisis by satisfying the Greeks
rather than offending them. His concerns on domestic politics still preceded those
on foreign affairs. As Lord Curzon, the British undersecretary of state for foreign
affairs, later confessed, the government “had had to reckon with the phil-Hellenic
tendencies in the country, which had permitted action by England against Greece,
but not action in favor of Turkey.”97 On 9 March, Salisbury told Count Deym, the
Austro-Hungarian ambassador, that it seemed to him “worthy of consideration
93 BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 119/11; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/35; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 369/4.
94 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/98; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/51; 1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi
ve Muhâberâtı, 66-67.
95 Turkey No. 11, No. 239.
96 Turkey No. 11, No. 258.
97 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 408.
49
whether the Greek force might not be divided and placed under officers of the
Powers, serving, of course, under the flag of the Power to whom they were
assigned. This arrangement could furnish the material for a gendarmerie, probably
better fitted than any other to keep order in a Greek district.”98 Unsurprisingly, this
suggestion of Salisbury, which obviously intended to legitimize the fait accompli
by the Greek government, did not receive any support from the other cabinets.
Muravyov openly criticized this idea on the grounds that such a concession would
not only encourage the Greeks, but also prove a dangerous example for the other
parts of the Ottoman Empire.99
In the meantime, the admirals in Crete were authorized by their
governments to apply required measures to assure the security of the island. Their
first target was the Greek Consulate in Hanya, which was generally recognized as a
hotbed of intrigue and conspiracy in the island.100 On 8 March, the admirals forced
Baraklis, the Greek vice-consul, to board a ship and leave the town along with a
number of Greek journalists. Their expulsion was carried out strictly despite
furious protests both from the consul and the Greek government.101 On 13 March,
Goluchowski stated to the Greek chargé d’affaires that: “The naval commanders
would naturally remove from Crete any person whose presence there they
considered dangerous.”102
In anticipation of the Greek reply to the verbal note of the Powers, the
admirals had unanimously proposed, on 5 March, to their respective governments a
project for the re-stabilization of affairs in Crete. The project included the
following clauses:
1. Blockade of the Piraeus and the principal Greek ports.
2. Blockade of Crete.
3. Governments to make Proclamation of blockade.
98 Turkey No. 11, No. 259.
99 Turkey No. 11, No. 267.
100 Ardern G. Hulme-Beaman, Twenty Years in the Near East (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 265.
101 Turkey No. 11, No. 263; İrtem, 49; Hulme-Beaman, 266; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî,
157.
102 Turkey No. 11, No. 300.
50
4. All Greek ships met at sea to be escorted to Milo, where they will be
placed in blockade.
5. Every hostile act committed by Greek ships against a ship of the Six
Powers will be considered as a declaration of war with the Six Powers.
6. Every Greek torpedo-boat will be repelled by gun fire if she comes
within range of the ships of the Powers.103
Although the project was agreed to by the admirals, its implementation
required approval by every Great Power as such a forceful plan of action would
upset the European Concert if put into force without unanimity. As expected, the
British proved to be the most averse party to undertake the project. Especially the
idea of blockading the Greek ports did not convince Salisbury at all. He believed
that the blockade of Crete, which he regarded “more efficacious and less
exasperating” than that of the Piraeus, would suffice.104 Yet, after receiving the
Greek reply to the collective verbal note of the Powers, the German, Russian and
Austro-Hungarian governments had begun to insist on the blockade of the Piraeus
even more fervently. Especially the Germans used the threat that they would
withdraw their forces from Crete if the Powers relented to Greece after such an
overt defiance.105 According to Marschall, the state of anarchy which existed in
Crete owed much to the presence of the Greek troops, and the security on the island
could not be restored as long as a single Greek soldier remained there.
Furthermore, he believed that the king of Greece would never risk his throne by
yielding to “half-measures” by Europe; but only to a resolute and united attitude by
the Powers would persuade him, as well as the Greek public.106 Muravyov thought
in the same way as his German colleague. He told Nicholas O’Conor, the British
ambassador in St. Petersburg, that as soon as the ports of the Piraeus, Patras and
Volo were blockaded, the Greeks, affected economically from that, would assume
a more reasonable attitude.107
103 Turkey No. 11, No. 245; Papadopoulos, 126.
104 Turkey No. 11, No. 256.
105 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 370.
106 Turkey No. 11, No. 280.
107 Turkey No. 11, No. 334.
51
Realizing the determination of these two states, Salisbury soon softened his
attitude. In fact, he was personally disposed towards the blockade of Crete and the
port of Volo, but this project was firmly opposed by certain members of the
government. After a few sessions in the cabinet, he formally declared to the various
ambassadors that Britain agreed only to the blockade of Crete;108 by adding that the
blockade of the Piraeus might be considered as necessary if the other measures
failed.109 The Italian government simply followed British policy, and would not
take part in any action without participation of Britain.110 The reluctance of Britain
and Italy put the French government into a difficult position, as its government was
eager to keep following Russia’s lead, but the tide of phil-Hellenism was constantly
rising among the French public.111 The most illustrious orators in France, such as
Jaurès, Clemenceau, Denys-Cochin and Millerand had already begun to protest
against government policy,112 and hundreds of French students were offering their
services to the Greek ambassador in Paris.113 The government feared that if the
public pressure rose to a certain level to change French foreign policy, the
agreement of the Powers on a certain common policy would be even more difficult,
and the European Concert could be disrupted as a result.
4. 6. The Escalation of Tension at the Ottoman-Greek Border
The lack of a monolithic attitude among the Powers towards Greece was
making the question even more complicated. The insistence of Germany, Russia
and Austria-Hungary for a blockade on Greek ports caused a fear among the
Greeks that they could not send enough forces to the Ottoman border in case of
108 Papadopoulos, 128-129; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/72.
109 Turkey No. 11, No. 281.
110 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/86.
111 Papadopoulos, 128.
112 Édouard Driault, La Grande Idée: La Renaissance de l’Hellénisme (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan,
1920), 164.
113 Charles W. Dilke and Demetrius N. Botassi, “The Uprising of Greece,” in North American
Review 164: 4 (April 1897), 461.
52
military conflict. On the other hand, the moderate policy of Britain induced the
Greeks to believe that their challenge could yield a result without waging war, just
as the way in which Thessaly had been ceded to Greece in 1881.114 These
circumstances assured the Greeks that the most rational response to these two
potential outcomes seemed to be assembling armed forces on the Ottoman frontier
as soon and much as possible. This is because, such an action would not only
render the blockade useless; but also be perceived in Europe as a threat to general
peace, urging the Powers to settle the question in a peaceful way. European
cabinets, influenced by their public opinion, could put pressure on the Ottoman
government to cede territory to Greece.115 Even if military preparations of Greece
were regarded by the Ottomans as provocation and precipitated a war with them,
the Powers would probably intervene in favor of the Greeks on the grounds that the
peace had been breached by the Ottoman side. As articulated by E. Ashmead
Bartlett, “it was simply the performance of a shrewd but hard-pressed gambler,
who, being in a desperate case, stakes heavily upon a single throw, knowing that,
even if he loses, his position will not be much worse.”116
With these calculations, full mobilization was declared in Greece on 15
March,117 and a massive maritime transportation of arms and munitions from the
Piraeus to Volo started immediately. The Ethnike Hetairia, by declaring that it was
too late for the Greek people to step back from fighting, was simultaneously
sending its armed bands to Thessaly and laying the groundwork for a general
insurrection in Macedonia.118 The number of provocations on the Ottoman border
increased accordingly.119 A law was passed in the Greek parliament to make it
possible for Greeks from abroad to enlist as volunteers in the army with the same
114 Goltz Paşa, 32; İrtem, 54.
115 Rose, 159.
116 Bartlett, 23.
117 Langer, 367.
118 İrtem, 52-53; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 226.
119 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/79.
53
status as Greek nationals.120 As a result, with the encouragement and assistance of
Greek consuls, volunteers from Samos, İzmir, Cyprus and other parts of the
Ottoman Empire began flowed to Greece.121 When these activities were evidently
pushing Greece into war, Smolenski, the Greek minister of war, resigned from his
position on the grounds that Greece was not prepared enough for such a big
campaign.122
The permanent increase in the hostile attitude of Greece and the uncertainty
of the European intervention caused a considerable degree of apprehension among
the Ottomans. A Greek offensive on the frontier was imminent and reports from
Bulgaria indicated that the Bulgarians were about an attack in Macedonia if they
became convinced that Greece would acquire a piece of land from the Ottoman
Empire.123 In order to avoid a large-scale conflict, the Sublime Porte immediately
resorted to military and diplomatic measures. Commanders in the region were
instructed that the army should keep vigilance against any kind of border violation,
while the peace should be fully respected and the order of troops should be
preserved with maximum care.124 The existing troops on the border were reinforced
by forming reservist units from the Albanians.125 A fleet under the command of
Hasan Râmi Paşa was sent to the Dardanelles to avert a Greek naval operation on
İstanbul.126 In addition, concerns about the inclusion of Serbia and Bulgaria to the
conflict were immediately presented to Nelidov. The Russian ambassador assured
the sultan that the Bulgarian and Serbian governments would not take any action
against the Ottoman Empire, as they had promised upon categorical warnings by
the czar, adding that the Ottoman government should refrain from sending troops to
120 Koliopoulos, 219.
121 Beria Remzi Özoran, “Tesalya Savaşı,” in Türk Kültürü 110 (December 1971), 109; BOA,
Y.PRK.HR., 23/68; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 369/4.
122 Tatsios, 105-106.
123 BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 119/56.
124 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/63; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/70.
125 Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1966), 3: 217.
126 İrtem, 55.
54
its borders with these two countries, in order not to stimulate nationalist sentiments
there.127
Despite having concentrated a strong army on the Greek frontier, the
Ottomans were regarding the use of force as the last resort. The potential
complications of military confrontation with Greece were well known in İstanbul,
and the sultan was of the opinion that even a war concluded by victory would be at
the expense of the state.128 He was still hopeful that the conflict could be settled
diplomatically with Greece, but he was reluctant to initiate direct negotiations with
the Greeks due to the fear of a reaction by the Great Powers.129 Therefore,
notwithstanding the prolongation of the negotiations in Europe, the Ottomans still
expected the solution from the Great Powers, and kept requesting them to
implement coercive measures on Greece at once.130
4. 7. The Blockade of Crete
In the middle of March, the Powers finally came to a collective decision on
the measures to be applied in Crete. These measures basically included the
blockade of Crete against all vessels carrying the Greek flag, and the establishment
of de facto autonomy in the island. On 15 March, Hanotaux declared in the French
parliament that the land forces of each Great Power in Crete would be reinforced
by an additional 500-600 soldiers.131 Two days later, the transportation of troops to
Crete began and the admirals were instructed by their governments to blockade the
island.132 The Greek and Ottoman governments were notified of the decision of the
Great Powers on March 18 and 19, respectively. The blockade was officially put
127 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/77.
128 Hasırcızade, Abdülhamid Han ve Osmanlı-Yunan Muharebesi (İstanbul: Ferşat, 1989), 16.
129 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 385. The Russians were in favor of such a bilateral agreement; as
Nelidov later expressed his regret that, even if some of the Powers had objected it, the sultan would
still have performed his attempt informally and confidentially: BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/77.
130 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/91.
131 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/83.
132 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 221; Tatsios, 101.
55
into effect on 21 March, at 8 o’clock in the morning.133 In addition, the admirals
announced to the Cretans that the island would be henceforth completely
independent in its internal affairs from the supervision and inspection of the
Ottoman government, and invited them to put down their arms immediately.134
However, this proclamation did not make a big impact among the insurgents and,
due to their demand of union with Greece, they kept their obedience to Colonel
Vassos.135 In addition, the extreme length and irregularity of the Cretan shores also
rendered the blockade ineffective.136 Under these circumstances, it was soon
realized that the latest effort by the Powers was still insufficient to pacify the
island. Alfred Biliotti, the British consul-general in Hanya, wrote to his
government that the latest effort by the Great Powers was not sufficient to prevent
war.137 The admirals requested further steps from their governments: i.e.
appointment of a governor-general to Crete, reinforcement of the troops under their
command, organization of the new regime in the island, application of pressure to
the Greek and Ottoman governments for withdrawing their forces, and blockade of
Piraeus.138
4. 8. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 3
4. 8. 1. Further Negotiations
Actually, it was well known in Europe that the blockade of Crete and
establishment of autonomy there were only half-measures to end the crisis between
Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The bellicose actions of Greece, followed by the
military preparations on the two sides of the frontier had transformed the Cretan
133 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 374-375; Turkey No. 11, No. 340.
134 BOA, Y.A.RES., 369/56.
135 Tatsios, 102.
136 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 223.
137 Yeğen, 290.
138 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 376-378.
56
question into a large-scale Ottoman-Greek conflict, shifting the locus of the crisis
from Crete to Thessaly and Epirus. This is why the negotiations on a collective
action to stop Greek aggression continued among the Powers even as the measures
to be applied in Crete were agreed on. The three continental empires were still
underlining the necessity of blockading ports on the Greek mainland in order to
prevent the imminent war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. On 17 March,
Marschall told the British ambassador that unless immediate pressure was put upon
Greece, war would be inevitable; because if the Greeks attacked, the Powers could
not prevent the Ottoman Empire from defending itself.139 But, on the same day,
Salisbury informed the Germans that, due to the prominence of phil-Hellenism in
his country, the British would continue to be “lookers-on” in case of war.140
The indifference of Britain was developing into a threat to the European
Concert. At that time Russia was pushing, at least in appearance, for rapid action to
keep the Greeks away from an armed conflict with the Ottomans. Muravyov,
urging the Powers to blockade the port of Volo without any delay, declared that if
Britain abstained at that juncture, the responsibility of a war between the Ottoman
Empire and Greece and a general conflagration in Macedonia would fall on the
British government.141 Goluchowski, realizing that the blockade could be carried
out more effectively without participation of Britain, tried to find a middle way
between Britain and the continental Powers by suggesting the British government
that the Greek ports could be blockaded by the other Powers while Britain joined
only in the blockade of Crete.142
Yet the British government was hesitant to approve such an action due to
the firm opposition from the Liberal Party. Instead, on March 20, Salisbury
proposed the other Powers to urge the Greek and Ottoman governments to
withdraw their forces up to 50 miles from their side of the frontier. If Greece
139 Turkey No. 11, No. 311.
140 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 371.
141 Turkey No. 11, No. 335.
142 Turkey No. 11, No. 338.
57
refused to comply with the summons, Britain would approve the blockade of Volo.
In case of a refusal from the Ottoman side, Britain would “be ready to partake in
the measures of coercion that the Powers would regard essential to be adopted.”143
This proposal did not receive any support from the other Powers, except
Italy.144 Hanotaux and Muravyov expressed their fears of an incursion by Greek
irregulars into Ottoman territory, and stated that 50 miles is too great a distance for
the Ottoman troops to defend their frontier.145 Goluchowski’s reply was that war
was imminent and addressing the summons to the two governments would be
nothing but loss of time.146 The German government was already unwilling to
address a further communication to Greece before the Greek troops were
withdrawn from Crete. Above all, the blockade of Volo was still regarded urgent
and indispensable by these four Powers because the Greeks were shipping all their
troops and supplies from the Piraeus to this port.
Under these circumstances, on March 23, Salisbury made a final declaration
that although Britain was prepared to join the blockade of the Greek littoral if and
when the other Powers agreed on it unanimously; London would not participate in
the blockade of Volo and the Piraeus.147 At the same time, the two governments
would be urged to withdraw their forces to a convenient distance from the frontier,
and the Sublime Porte would be informed that if the Ottoman forces crossed into
Greek territory, that would be regarded as a hostile act against Britain.148
4. 8. 2. Deadlock
The declaration of Salisbury demonstrated once again the high level of
influence of the public opinion and opposition on the British foreign policy. With
143 Turkey No. 11, No. 341.
144 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 370/51.
145 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 345, 359.
146 Turkey No. 11, No. 362.
147 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 381.
148 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 383; Papadopoulos, 132.
58
its dilatory attitude, the British government was virtually forsaking the European
Concert. Hanotaux reacted to the proposal of Britain by telling Count Wolkenstein,
the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, “this is the end of the European
Concert,” while Wilhelm regretted that if Germany had possessed a strong navy,
the German viewpoint would have been received by the other Powers with much
esteem.149 In response to the latest declaration of Salisbury, the Russian
government decided to abandon its efforts for coercive measures as it was “jaded
by waiting and seeing its paralyzed initiative.” Thus the attempts for a collective
measure over Greece were suspended for some time.150
However, the anarchy in Crete was still going on and the Greeks were
taking further steps towards war. On March 26, with a royal decree, Prince
Constantine was named commander-in-chief of the Greek army in Thessaly and
was sent to Volo the following night.151 Small-scale provocations on the Ottoman
border were still being perpetrated by the Greek irregulars.152 The imminence of
war led the admirals in Crete to warn their governments once again. According to
them, the time for half-measures was past, and in order to persuade the Greek
government to comply with the resolution of the Powers, the Gulf of Athens should
be blockaded immediately and Greek vessels should be “moved away, encircled
and detained.”153 This firm warning of the admirals surprisingly changed the
attitude of the British government. Finally winning the assent of his colleagues to a
compromise, Salisbury declared at the end of March that Britain was ready for the
blockade of the Gulf of Athens whenever asked by the admirals, and approved
collectively by the other Great Powers.154
This was the most critical moment of the negotiations; as Salisbury’s
declaration left it open to the Powers to take action. But, in fact, cabinets in Europe
149 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 386.
150 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 382.
151 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 382; Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 39.
152 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 370/51.
153 BOA, Y.A.HUS., 370/103; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 382; Papadopoulos, 133.
154 Turkey No. 11, No. 385.
59
were not totally decisive to do that. Since the admirals opposed sending their
vessels, which were still being used in the blockade of Crete, to the Gulf of Athens,
dispatch of massive reinforcements was required to commence the blockade.155
Except Germany and Austria-Hungary, which still insisted on blockade, the Powers
were disinclined to send additional forces to the Near East. Thus, they tried to
evade this commitment with certain pretexts. Italy declared its reluctance to use
coercive measures against Greece, by pointing out that the Greeks would be
infuriated, while France posed equal contribution by the Great Powers as a
prerequisite for its participation. The Russians, believing that the Greek troops had
already been transported to Thessaly and the blockade could drive the Greeks
towards hostilities, did not show any willingness to support this measure
anymore.156 In short, the negotiations that had continued among the Powers ad
nauseam came to a halt with no practical result.
The disappearance of Russian disposition towards the blockade owes much
to the clarification of the Balkan states’ attitudes. The primary concern of the
Russians was to preserve the status-quo in the Balkans, and what they feared most
was the possibility of a general conflagration in the region. This is why the
Russians had taken the lead in urging Bulgaria and Serbia to keep neutral in case of
war, while proposing the other Powers implementation of forceful measures on
Greece to stop its aggression. Yet in mid-March, discovering the understanding
between these two states, the Russians became convinced that neither was willing
to upset the status-quo in the Balkans at that time. Since the possibility of a multisided
conflict had decreased, it was no longer a prudent strategy for them to insist
on a blockade. First of all, the utility of the blockade was doubtful. Certain Powers
were still reluctant to participate in the blockade and further negotiations on that
would be disruptive upon the existing harmony within the European Concert.
Furthermore, if the blockade was commenced with Russian initiative, the
155 BOA, İ.MTZ.GR., 31/1205.
156 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 383; Grenville, 92; Langer, 368; Papadopoulos, 132-134.
60
reputation of Russia among the Greeks would be damaged seriously and that would
be detrimental for the Russian influence over the competition in Macedonia. On
condition that Bulgaria and Serbia would remain strictly unmoved, it would even
be to the advantage of the Russians to stay out of the conflict and watch Greece and
the Ottoman Empire, the two non-Slav states in the region, wear each other out.157
4. 9. Further Developments in the Ottoman Empire and Greece
At the end of March, a massive number of troops had been concentrated on
both sides of the Ottoman-Greek frontier. But the overtones rising from each side
were completely opposite. The Ottomans were extremely anxious about the
developments and were willing to keep acting with utmost caution. Although they
were confident that the Greek army would be defeated without much effort, the
Ottomans were concerned with the possible repercussions of war and, thus,
reluctant to have recourse to violent measures.158 According to them, peace had to
be maintained, but, at the same time, the danger of invasion by the Greeks had to
be averted. Especially the concentration of Greek irregular bands near the frontier
caused great apprehension that these bands could cross the border and instigate a
revolt in Macedonia. There were even some attempts at crossing the border and the
Ottoman army promptly repulsed the intruders back to Greek territory. But they
could not be pursued further, since the Ottomans were almost sure that any
violation of the Greek border, even conducted with totally defensive concerns,
would be severely opposed by the Great Powers, and, therefore, would serve the
interests of Greece. On the other hand, occupation of even a very small portion of
Ottoman territory by the Greeks, which would signify a change in the regional
balances, would also create grave results for the future of the empire.159 Under
these circumstances, the Ottoman army, while staying strictly on its side of the
157 Bartlett, 29.
158 Turkey No. 11, No. 382.
159 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/7.
61
border, had to be extremely careful not to allow any crossing by the Greek forces.
This was a not an easy task, especially bearing in mind the fact that the frontier was
considerably long and mountainous.
Furthermore, even though Bulgaria and Serbia pledged neutrality, it was
almost certain that neither would keep indifferent if the war spread to Macedonia.
On 22 March, the Serbian king told the British minister in Belgrade that Serbia
would keep its neutrality in case of war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire
unless a massacre, directed towards Christians, took place in Kosova and
Macedonia.160 This statement evidently meant that the Serbians were cautiously
watching the developments and would take action if necessary. The attitude of
Bulgaria was more or less the same. Under these circumstances, the Russians and
Austrians, not to mention the Ottomans, were extremely anxious to keep the
conflict limited. The latter especially grew apprehensive about the possibility of a
general rising by not only the Christians in the Balkans, but also those inhabiting
the other parts of the empire, particularly the Armenians. Accordingly, the Sublime
Porte issued the following circular:
While the state is engaged with the Cretan and Greek problems, even a
small-scale strife between Muslims and non-Muslims could create grave
results such as foreign intervention. Officials should always stay vigilant,
keeping in mind the delicateness of the time. Millet leaders should be
appropriately requested to duly execute the civil law of their
communities. If an incident happens somewhere, local authorities who
are responsible for public administration and security will be held
responsible and penalized severely.161
As for the Greek side of the frontier, what was observed there in general
was a high level of excitement and resolution for war. The Greeks felt totally
frustrated because their occupation of Crete, as well as their huge campaign of
military preparation had not borne any fruit yet. According to them, by blockading
Crete and discussing the blockade of Greek ports, the Great Powers were taking the
160 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/83.
161 BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 612/10.
62
side of the Ottomans.162 If the Greek government gave in at that moment, all the
preparations would go to waste and Greece, let alone obtaining a gain, could
eventually be blamed by Europe for attempting to intimidate the Concert with false
displays. Thus, in the eyes of the Greeks, the only way to end this deadlock seemed
to be another outrageous move, a military challenge against the Ottoman Empire.
Although they were aware of the imbalance between the two armies, in favor of the
Ottomans, the Greeks still believed that the war could produce more favorable
results than the actual situation. Above all, the Ottoman Empire was known to be
worn out by perpetual financial crises and Armenian uprisings. If the Greeks were
able to induce Bulgaria and Serbia to a joint action, that would be disastrous for the
Ottomans and could yield territory to Greece in the Balkans. Alternatively, the
Great Powers, intimidated by the hard attitude of Greece, might intervene before a
serious confrontation between the Greek and Ottoman troops, and offer mediation
which would be favorable for both sides. In any case, the Greeks calculated, taking
the risk of war would grant some result, while succumbing to the opposition of the
Powers would bring nothing.
Although the majority of the Greeks had this point of view, both the king
and the government still kept to their mixed attitude towards war. While being
encouraged by the motivation of the public, the intimidations and encouragements
by the Ethnike Hetairia, as well as the potential benefits a war could bring, they
were also aware that Greece took an adventurous risk. If the calculations would not
come true and the Great Powers, or the other Balkan states, would not involve in
the conflict, there would be the danger of a humiliating defeat at the hands of the
Ottomans. Such a defeat would be completely disastrous for the finances of
Greece, which was actually in deep crisis, while injuring the reputation of the king
and the government both at home and abroad. In addition, after a defeat, Greece
162 The War Dispatches of Stephen Crane, edited by R. W. Stallman and E. R. Hagemann (New
York: New York University Press, 1964), 19-21; Turkey No. 11, Nos. 401, 421.
63
could lose its power to carry on the rivalry with the other Balkan states over
Macedonia and that would be a big setback in the pursuit of the Megale Idea.
These concerns led the Greek leaders to come to terms directly with the
Ottomans. The request was made personally by Deligiannis through the Ottoman
legation in Athens. The sultan immediately replied that his only desire was
maintaining peace, and, if the Greek government agreed to withdraw its forces
from the border and Crete, the Ottoman Empire would be ready to sign a
convention, as before, against the destructive activities of banditry on both sides of
the frontier.163 The leaders on both sides seemed to have similar tendencies, while a
direct settlement between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was also desired by the
Powers, at least by Russia and France.164 Alexandros Mavrokordatos, the Greek
ambassador in İstanbul, was also highly discomforted with the current trends in his
country, and willing to reinstate the peaceful relations between the two states.165
However, after few deliberations, no result was obtained, simply because the
Greeks did not cease dispatching troops to the frontier, making the Ottomans
suspicious about their genuine intentions. After being requested by Mavrokordatos
to act as a mediator before the sultan for a peaceful settlement, Hasan Hüsnî Paşa,
the Ottoman minister of navy, wrote to Abdülhamid that:
The Greeks, overwhelmed by the mobilization of a huge army, as well as
the preparation of naval forces, by the Ottoman Empire in a quite short
period of time, are in search of a tool for reversing their wrong policy.
The attempt may even be a political plot to create the impression among
the European Powers that Greece is acting in a peaceful manner.166
It is hard to determine what the real intentions of the Greek leaders were at
that time. But whatever they may be, their influence on the course of events was
trivial. The die had been cast, and the war was resolved. People on the streets and
in cafes were vehemently claiming that the time to realize the great cause of
163 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/11.
164 Papadopoulos, 140.
165 [Serasker] Rızâ Paşa, Hülâsâ-i Hâtırât (İstanbul: [s.n.], 1325), 47.
166 BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 120/36.
64
Hellenism had finally come. Their nationalist and irredentist sentiments were
bolstered by newspapers, which simply followed the domestic trends.167 An
extreme level of excitement and overconfidence was observed in the Greek
army.168 Bands of the Ethnike Hetairia, consisting of 1,200 to 1,500 men,169 were
inspired by the arrival of Prince Constantine in Thessaly and were growing
impatient to commence raids into Ottoman territory. Under these circumstances,
leaders were no longer able to control the developments, let alone to reverse them.
After his arrival in Thessaly, the crown prince had been advised by Deligiannis to
hold the irregulars from crossing the border. A number of brigands that had
trespassed Ottoman territory were accordingly arrested by Greek forces.170 But,
only a few days later, the prime minister, under pressure of the public and the
Ethnike Hetairia, retracted his advice. As long as the domestic pressures rendered
war inevitable, he believed, it was better the war commenced sooner than later,
because the Greek finances lacked the resources to keep the army mobilized for a
long time.171 Therefore, without giving a direct order to the irregulars to fight, he
asked the crown prince to let the irregulars act in their own way.172
4. 10. The Verbal Note of 6 April: The Last Diplomatic Effort by the Powers
Since the war was obviously imminent, the next question in minds was
when it would break out. In European circles it was estimated that the Greeks
would commence hostilities on 6 April, the independence day of Greece,173 when
their excitement would reach its zenith. As a last attempt of deterrence, Muravyov
167 Mille, 169-170.
168 Rose, 32-34.
169 Koliopoulos, 217.
170 BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/840.
171 Devlet-i Aliyye ve Yunan Muhârebesi Hakkında Müdâvele-i Efkâr, translated by Abdî Tevfik
(İstanbul: İkdâm, 1315), 73.
172 Austro-Hungarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian Struggle: 1896-1912, edited by F. R.
Bridge (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), No. 21.
173 On 6 April 1821 (25 March of the Julian calendar) Archbishop Germanos, the Metropolitan of
Patras, raised the Greek national banner and gave the first signal of the Greek revolutionary
movement against the Ottoman Empire.
65
proposed the other five Powers to address a further communication to the Greek
and Ottoman governments.174 Unlike the project of blockading Greek ports, this
proposal was immediately approved unanimously by the Powers. On 6 April, the
following text was submitted to both governments as a verbal note:
In face of the danger due to the concentration of massive forces on the
Ottoman-Greek frontier by both states, the Great Powers, who desire the
preservation of peace and tranquility, have instructed their ambassadors
in İstanbul and Athens to declare that;
In case of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, the aggressor
will be held entirely responsible for the conflict,
Whatever the result of the war may be, the Great Powers will in no case
allow the aggressor to derive the least advantage from that.175
If the Greeks had decided to set out to act on 6 April, this attempt of the
Powers, which was actualized on the very same day, would have been too late. But
the events did not turn out the way it was feared in Europe. The Ethnike Hetairia
had not yet completed preparations for starting the raids and it was known that the
Ottoman army was on the alert for countering a Greek attack.176 Besides, 6 April
was a Tuesday, an ill-omened day with all Greeks.177 Hence, except a few
nationalistic demonstrations, nothing happened in Greece on that day.
The verbal note of 6 April was responded to by the Sublime Porte on 8
April with a long reply. After indicating that the pacific intentions of the Great
Powers were totally shared by the Ottomans, the Porte reminded the Powers that
the only aim of the concentration of Ottoman troops at the frontier was to defend
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the empire. If the Greek government
agreed to recall its forces from Crete and the Ottoman frontier, the note continued,
the Ottoman troops at the frontier would also be withdrawn immediately, since the
reasons which had necessitated their mobilization would have disappeared. In
conclusion, it was stated that the Ottoman government was truly eager to witness
174 Turkey No. 11, No. 395.
175 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/13; Turkey No. 11, No. 414; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 383-384; Vecîhî, et al.,
114.
176 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 266.
177 Nevinson, 55; Hasırcızade, 14.
66
the reciprocal withdrawal of troops, and the Powers should encourage the cabinet
of Athens to obtain such a result.178
4. 11. The First Raid of Greek Irregulars
Ironically, the first spark of the impending war was set on the same day on
which the Ottoman government issued this peaceable statement. On the evening of
8 April, around 10 o’clock, bands of Greek irregulars crossed the Ottoman border.
They occupied the Kranya (Kranea) hill, surrounded a number of Ottoman
guardhouses, blew up a blockhouse and cut the telegram lines. After invading the
village of Baltinos (Baltimon) the insurgents proceeded towards the town of
Grebene (Grevena).179 Although the number of the irregulars employed in the
attacks was obviously not enough to overcome the Ottoman forces, the Ethnike
Hetairia had estimated that they would be supported by Christians living in the
Ottoman territory. After crossing the border, the irregulars attempted to instigate
the local Christian population to join their attack. But these attempts proved
fruitless. After gaining a few minor successes, the bands were dispersed and driven
back to Greece in a short time.180
These incidents were immediately protested by the Ottoman government.
These protestations were ignored by Skouzes as he claimed that no troops from
Greece had participated in the attack. Instead, according to him, the perpetrators
had been Macedonian insurgents, thus subjects of the sultan. Refusing any
responsibility concerning the incidents, Skouzes protested the Ottoman government
on the grounds that Greek outposts had been fired by Ottoman troops “without any
reason.”181 On the other hand, Deligiannis informed the British and Ottoman
ministers that the bands who had crossed were volunteers, “clad in fustanellas with
178 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/13; Y.PRK.HR., 24/6; Turkey No. 11, No. 431. See Appendix D.
179 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20; BOA, Y.EE., 49/22; Goltz Paşa, 91.
180 Rose, 52-55.
181 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 390.
67
a distinguishing cap and a description of uniform with the letters ‘E.E.’ [i.e.
Ethnike Hetairia] on them.” But the premier firmly rejected the allegations that
regular troops had been employed in the attack and stated that the crown prince had
strict orders to give no encouragement to the bands, and to remain on the defensive
against an Ottoman offensive.182
Yet the Ottomans strongly believed that the bands had been supported by
the Greek army. Telegrams from the frontier indicated that the bands had utilized
artillery, which was not a weapon owned by volunteer groups, and they had been
directed by bugle-calls.183 A Greek captive confessed to Clive Bigham, the special
correspondent of Times with the Ottoman army, that he was a reservist and he had
been armed by the Greek army and dispatched to the frontier.184 On 9 April, the
Council of Ministers evaluated the situation in an extraordinary sitting. Since these
data were not based on official reports, the Ottomans did not have a strong casus
belli. Hence, the council decided to communicate the latest incidents, including the
information suggesting that regular troops had been involved in the crossing, to the
Great Powers and to sound out them about whether they would still hold the
Ottomans responsible if a major conflict arose with Greece.185
The communication by the Ottoman government, dated 10 April, was
responded by the Powers with sympathy, as the responsibility of Greece for the
escalation of the crisis was obvious. Marschall replied that the latest incidents
showed how right he had been when advising the Ottomans, as early as February,
to get ready on the Greek frontier.186 The incidents also created great anxiety in the
French government. Hanotaux, while instructing his minister in Athens to search
the means of a concerted action before the Greek government,187 gave quite a frank
182 Turkey No. 11, No. 444; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/33.
183 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/15; BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20; Rızâ Paşa, 45.
184 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 275.
185 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/15; Turkey No. 11, No. 418.
186 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20.
187 With the initiative of the French foreign minister, the representatives of the Powers in Athens
discussed about submitting a collective note to the Greek government and requesting removal of
Greek forces some distance away from the frontier. But the German minister abstained from
68
answer to Sâlih Münir Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, who delivered him
the abovementioned note. Hanotaux admitted that the Ottoman government had
always adopted a reasonable and deliberate policy, but the Powers had not found
heretofore an adequately effective means of expressing themselves to Greece. He
advised the ambassador that if the Greeks had really taken the offensive the
Ottoman army should respond promptly, and added that: “I do not believe that the
other Balkan states will involve in the conflict unless a rebellion and bloodshed
occurs in Macedonia. But since there is always some possibility for such an
incident, the Ottoman government should act with utmost equanimity, serenity and
caution.”188
4. 12. Going to War or Not: The Dilemma at İstanbul
The Ottomans were indeed acting with utmost caution, and the sultan was
unquestionably the most cautious of them. Since the dispatch of troops to the Greek
border, he had issued constant orders underlining that if Greek irregulars crossed
the Ottoman frontier without involvement of Greek regular army, and if the
Ottoman army took the offensive in response, full responsibility of the conflict
would be charged on the Ottomans and the positive attitude of the Great Powers
towards the empire would vanish accordingly. But the latest incidents exhausted
the patience of the majority of ministers in the Ottoman cabinet. Their primary fear
was that the Greek irregulars could succeed in causing a general uprising in
Macedonia. According to them, the Greeks had once again attacked with mixed
irregular and regular forces, as they did in 1854, 1878 and 1886, and, under these
circumstances, no responsibility could be placed on the Ottoman government for
further hostilities. The views of German and French foreign ministers had also
participating, by declaring that he was no longer authorized by his government to participate in a
collective communication to the Greek government; as the Greeks had not given enough
consideration to the warnings by Europe. As a result, no communication was made: Driault and
Lhéritier, 4: 390; Turkey No. 11, No. 435.
188 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/8.
69
confirmed, though implicitly, that the Ottomans had right to respond to the attacks.
During the sitting on 11 April, the Council of Ministers assessed the situation and
finally decided to recommend the declaration of war to the sultan with the
following considerations:
After crossing the border, they are going to arm and instigate the local
Christians in order to create disturbances to the Ottoman army from
inside and thus to prevent an Ottoman counter-offensive. Since Yanya is
more suitable for attack, the Greeks may move the bulk of their forces to
that front by leaving only a few battalions at Alasonya. If their assault on
Yanya yields a positive result for them, God forbid, that can not only
change the international balances; but also stimulate the Christian
population all over Rumelia to rise up… In order to prevent such grave
results, the Ottoman army, after checking the aggression, should initiate a
swift counter-offensive without losing any time.189
But it was not easy to induce the sultan to relinquish his extreme reluctance
towards war. This is because he still believed that the Greeks would not dare to
declare war on the Ottoman Empire, and that the latest incidents were one of their
intrigues to provoke the Ottomans and attribute the responsibility of a future
conflict to them. On 11 April, the very same day of the council’s recommendation
for war, the sultan sent the following order directly to the headquarters in
Alasonya:
If the Greek regular forces attack without declaring war, fulfill your
military responsibilities without deviating from the previous directions;
and always provide information to the palace. In case of a bandit attack,
as frequently underlined before, expel these bandits as promptly as
possible; but you shall by no means cross the Greek border.190
On the following day, the sultan issued a long reply to the recommendation
of the cabinet. At the beginning of his irâde, the sultan underlined that the decision
of the ministers was based upon reports claiming that Greek regular forces had
participated in the latest incidents. But since these reports lacked substantial proof,
declaration of war would not be a prudent action. European Powers had repeatedly
warned the Ottoman Empire not to declare war until Greece engaged in an act of
189 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20.
190 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/29.
70
hostility and aggression. The latest statement of Hanotaux had also portrayed an
offensive by the Greek army as the precondition for an Ottoman response. But the
Greek government firmly and repeatedly declared that regular troops had not been
involved in the latest incidents and every measure was being taken to prevent such
activities. This attitude of Greece, the sultan believed, was intended to obtain the
compassion of Europe, and might even be encouraged by a Great Power behind
closed doors. Hence, he continued, the proceedings could not be regarded as a
simple confrontation and the friendship of the Great Powers, albeit ostensible, had
to be preserved as much as possible. Otherwise, the empire would face the danger
“to be subjected to a harsher reaction from Europe than what had happened in
Navarino during the Greek revolution.” In conclusion, the sultan ordered that the
state of peace should be maintained and the shortages of the army should be
completed before deciding to wage war. Furthermore, with a verbal note, the Great
Powers should be informed that the only desire of the Ottoman Empire was to
defend its territories and if Greece was induced to withdraw its forces from Crete
and the border, the Ottoman Empire would negotiate the autonomy of Crete with
the Great Powers. Besides, an ultimatum should be given to Greece.191
In accordance with the decree of the sultan, the Powers were informed by
the Sublime Porte that the instance of provocation by the Greeks would not be
considered a casus belli if such an incident did not happen again.192 Additionally, a
verbal note to the Greek government demanded to stop the activities of the bands
and warned that further violations of the border would be regarded by the Ottomans
as committed by the Greek regular army.193
However, the divergence between the views of the cabinet and the sultan
was becoming more obvious than ever. While the former was advocating an
energetic policy to end Greek aggression, the latter was still describing violations
191 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/33; Türkgeldi, 3: 74-75.
192 George Herbert Perris, The Eastern Crisis of 1897 and British Policy in the Near East (London:
Chapman and Hall Limited, 1897), 234.
193 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 286.
71
of the border as “bandit attacks” and advising pacifism and caution. This attitude of
Abdülhamid became a source of irritation for certain ministers. Particularly Rızâ
Paşa, the minister of war, had no patience left for the Greek provocations. If these
provocations were countenanced, according to him, other Balkan states as well as
Austria-Hungary would also adopt aggressive policies for their causes over the
region.194 Mehmed Said Paşa, the chief of the Council of State (Şûrâ-i Devlet), was
of the opinion that peaceful measures, such as giving an additional ultimatum to
Greece, would result in an international conference, which would not settle the
question in favor of the Ottomans.195 Without blaming the sultan directly, the
supporters of war attributed his extreme reluctance to the counsels of Arab İzzet
Paşa, the second secretary of the palace (mâbeyn kâtib-i sânisi), who was known to
have high influence on Abdülhamid’s decisions.196
Although the sultan’s attitude was regarded by certain ministers as
pusillanimity, his concerns were not totally unfounded. With the experience of the
disastrous war against Russia in 1877-1878, he feared another large-scale campaign
resulting in partition of the empire through international conference. It was almost
certain that the Great Powers would disapprove the declaration of war by the
Ottoman Empire if there was not enough proof on the involvement of Greek
regular troops in the latest incidents. Even if the Powers would not react
immediately and the war broke out, that would entail the danger of a general rising
in Macedonia, which would again be followed by foreign intervention. It was true
that the Great Powers were disposed to preserve the existing boundaries in the
Balkans at that time, but a large-scale conflict in the region could change the
balances and, thus, reverse the policy of the Powers.197 A slight success of the
194 Rızâ Paşa, 59.
195 [Sadrazam] Sait Paşa, Anılar (İstanbul: Hürriyet, 1977), 183.
196 Ziya Şakir, Sultan Abdülhamid’in Yunan Zaferi ve Gizli Siyaseti (İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1994), 25;
Rızâ Paşa, 45; Tatsios, 111.
197 This is exactly what happened later in the First Balkan War (1912). No matter how the Great
Powers issued a collective declaration affirming the status-quo of the Ottoman boundaries just
before the outbreak of the war, they finally recognized all territorial acquisitions of the Balkan
states. This radical change of stance was explained by Serge Sazonov, the Russian minister of
72
Greeks would raise this risk to the maximum. This is why the sultan regarded the
war as the last resort and wanted to be totally confident with the strength of his
army before deciding to launch the campaign. On 13 April, the headquarters in
Alasonya still reported that the army needed four divisions of soldiers, munitions,
vehicles and other military supplies for attack.198 Under these circumstances,
Abdülhamid was still anxious to see the pacific settlement of the conflict, which
would probably be fulfilled by a collective action by the Powers. In accordance
with the will of the sultan, Tevfik Paşa requested Baron von Saurma, the German
ambassador, once more to apply the required coercive measures on Greece without
delay. In reply, the ambassador stated his belief that the blockade on certain ports
of Greece, including the Piraeus would commence in a few days.199
Despite the optimism of the German ambassador, it was clear that there was
a lack of unity among the Powers towards a drastic measure against Greece.
Muravyov, describing the existing situation in Europe as a “crisis,” advised the
Ottomans to maintain their prudence and caution.200 But the apparent lethargy of
the Ottoman Empire in face of provocations coming from a smaller, and a
Christian, state began to create a deep concern within the Ottoman public and
army. It was commonly believed that the hesitation of the empire was damaging to
its international reputation and, furthermore, encouraging the Serbs and Bulgarians
to resort to self-help in Macedonia.201 If the sultan persisted in his refusal to order
his troops to advance, his position could be similar to that of King George in the
eyes of his subjects.202
foreign affairs, that the real purpose of the declaration had been to preclude any kind of Ottoman
territorial gain: Mustafa Aksakal, “Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914
and the Ottoman Decision for War.” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, Princeton, 2003), 74.
198 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/21.
199 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/16.
200 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/12.
201 Karal, 8: 116; BOA, Y.PRK.ŞD., 2/34; BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 29-30.
202 Papadopoulos, 140.
73
4. 13. The Declaration of War
On the night between 16 and 17 April, another incident took place at the
Ottoman-Greek border. Greek irregulars, assisted by regular forces, attempted
another raid in Ottoman territory and they were met by Ottoman troops with a
counter-offensive. As soon as the first reports arrived from the frontier, the Council
of Ministers convened in the Yıldız Palace. Most of the ministers were in favor of
war, but since they also acknowledged the concerns of the sultan, the cabinet was
not able to reach a decision easily. The sitting continued for hours. Rızâ Paşa,
persistently stressing that the empire had to demonstrate its ability to resist external
threats and assuring the ministers that the state had adequate resources to cover the
expenses of an armed campaign, finally convinced the cabinet to decide on war.
Then he was called by the sultan for a face-to-face discussion. Abdülhamid,
thinking that a defeat would be completely disastrous for the empire, requested the
minister to reevaluate the situation. In response, Rızâ Paşa o indicated that the empire
would face no lesser difficulties if there was no war. Eventually, in the evening of
17 April, the sultan, albeit unwillingly, gave his consent and approved the minute
of the cabinet which declared war on Greece.203 Diplomatic relations with Greece
were ruptured. The headquarters in Alasonya was ordered to carry out “whatever
was required militarily.”204
This order denoted implementation of the war plan against Greece, which
had been designed in 1886 by Muzaffer, Ali Saib and Veli Rızâ Paşas o, under the
supervision of Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz.205 This plan basically stipulated
remaining on the defensive in Epirus and moving forward swiftly in Thessaly. This
is because while an offensive in the former would not yield a substantial result, a
number of large Greek towns and, more importantly, the major route in north-south
direction could be put under threat by an offensive in the latter. With such a threat,
203 Rızâ Paşa, 48-52; Türkgeldi, 3: 76.
204 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32; BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/850. See Appendix E.
205 Goltz Paşa, 25, 62.
74
the Ottomans would keep the battle on Greek territory and, thus, prevent a conflict
between Muslims and Christians throughout Rumelia.206 In addition, a lightning
attack with massive forces on Larissa and Trikkala would cut the Greek army’s
route of retreat and force them to surrender.207 This was the best preferred strategy
for the sultan, as it could enable the Ottomans to win the war in the shortest time
possible. Prolongation of the war would not only create a significant financial
burden, but also increase the possibility of complications within the empire,
particularly in its Balkan territories.208
Upon the authorization of the Sublime Porte, Turkish newspapers
announced in the morning of 18 April that the war broke out and Greek nationals
and vessels should leave the country in fifteen days.209 The Porte communicated
the declaration of war to the Great Powers on the same day through its
ambassadors in Europe. The text of the communication was prepared with extreme
finesse in order not to give an impression that the Ottomans had an invasive
purpose. After the policies and attitudes of the Greek and Ottoman governments
were reminded with reference to earlier incidents, the communication was
concluded as follows:
The Imperial Government, as they have frequently stated, entertain no
idea of conquest against Greece, and if they are now forced to accept war,
for their legitimate defense in consequence of open hostilities on the part
of Greece, it is simply for the protection of their most sacred rights and
their integrity. If within a short time the Greek government withdraw
their troops from Crete and their frontiers, the Imperial Government, in
order to afford fresh proof of their pacific intentions, will not fail, on their
side, to stop their military movements. Such is the sincere intention of the
Imperial Government, who rely on the sentiments of equity and justice of
the Great Powers.210
The sultan had long believed that the audacity of Greece must have been
based on encouragements by a Great Power, and the first Power that came to his
206 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32.
207 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/36.
208 Goltz Paşa, 53-62; Kocabaş, 281.
209 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, 288-290.
210 Turkey No. 11, No. 437; BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32; BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/850; Türkgeldi, 3: 221-
222.
75
mind was usually Russia.211 He had assumed that an armed conflict in the Balkans
would have been used as a pretext by the Russians, as happened in 1877, to declare
war on the Ottoman Empire. Hence, after the outbreak of war with Greece,
Abdülhamid felt obliged to address a direct communication to the Russian
government, in addition to the abovementioned communication submitted
identically to the six Powers. After explaining that the declaration of war was
unavoidable under present circumstances, the sultan invited the Russians to
“distinguish the aggressor and the oppressed with utmost equity despite the Greeks
are Orthodox and strong family bonds exist between the Greek and Russian
dynasties.”212
While the Ottomans accused the Greeks of being responsible for the latest
developments, the Greeks did the same for the Ottomans. With a royal declaration,
which was read in the Greek parliament on 18 April, it was claimed that the
hostilities had been initiated by Ottoman troops, as they had attacked the neutral
zone without any reason. Greece, the declaration continued, had always pursued its
“noble goal, which was imposed upon her by its duties towards civilization and by
a sentiment that is possessed by every people towards their coreligionists and
congeners,” by pacific means, but when the Ottomans declared war, the Greeks had
no choice but to accept that.213
4. 14. The Attitudes of the Great Powers towards the War
The verbal note which the Powers had submitted to the Greek and Ottoman
governments on 6 April had a remarkable influence over the attempts of the two
sides to justify war. Both belligerents tried to convince the Great Powers that the
entire responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities belonged to the other side. The
reason for this effort was the fair belief that, regardless of who the eventual victor
211 Türkgeldi, 3: 76.
212 BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 29-30.
213 Turkey No. 11, No. 451; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 391-393.
76
was, any territorial, financial and political change the war would entail depended
on the will and consent of the Great Powers. Bearing in mind numerous
experiences the empire had suffered before, the sultan and the Porte feared that
they would face the Powers once again, either in the battlefield or in a conference,
if the responsibility of hostilities was charged on the Ottomans. On the other hand,
the Greeks primarily wished to draw sympathy of the European public opinion by
creating the impression that they were blameless and, furthermore, the oppressed
side.
As discussed earlier, all the Great Powers were disposed to preserve the
status-quo in the Balkans, thus an Ottoman-Greek war was not desirable for any of
them. But their common disposition did not produce a collective action to prevent
the war. The efforts by the three “conservative” states, namely Russia, Germany
and Austria-Hungary, to implement an effectively forceful measure to contain
Greece had not come about as the three “democracies,” namely France, Italy and,
above all, Britain, were somewhat influenced by their public against such an action.
When the latter group tended to come to an accord with the former, it was too late
to reverse the Greek mobilization through blockade. In addition, the assurance of
neutrality given by Bulgaria and Serbia signified that even if war broke out it
would be only a minor and local conflict. European correspondents in Macedonia
were also reporting that a Christian insurrection in the region was exceedingly
remote, and that even if it took place it would be promptly put down by the
Ottoman forces.214 These circumstances left little motivation to the Powers for
undertaking the costly and bothersome task of naval blockade. The fervent
negotiations among the European cabinets for drastic measures were accordingly
replaced by diplomatic efforts to prevent the war.
The outbreak of war did not create any change in the attitudes of the
Powers. This is not because their willingness for the preservation of the status-quo
214 Bigham, 15
77
had faded away, but simply because none of them regarded the war as a major
threat for the balances in the Southeastern Europe. Above all, it was almost certain
that the Ottomans would easily defeat the Greeks. This would be an agreeable
result for the Powers, as an Ottoman victory over Greece would not only keep the
Slavic states unmoved, but also deter the Greeks against further attempts that
would threaten security of the Balkans.215 In this respect, permitting the war to take
place was actually a more expedient strategy, at least for the “democracies,” than
applying coercive measures directly on Greece. In addition, the Ottoman claims for
territory after their victory could be easily refused with reference to the statement
of the Porte that the only aim of the Ottoman Empire while waging war was
defending its territory. On the other hand, in case of a surprise success of Greece,
the Powers could still keep the status-quo, as they had already declared that the
aggressor would not gain any benefit from the war. With these considerations, the
Great Powers maintained their neutrality and set themselves to wait for a suitable
time for intervention.216
215 In the eyes of the Powers, the war would be check on the Greek irredentism, which posed a
considerable threat to the stability of the Balkans. After the declaration of the war, the ambassadors
of the Great Powers told Tevfik Paşa that they backed this decision of the Sublime Porte as they
were annoyed by the hostile attitude of Greece: BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/15.
216 Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 354.
78
CHAPTER 5
EPILOGUE
The Greek public and statesmen shared a common goal of “liberating their
brethren abroad” since the establishment of modern Greece. In order to actualize
the Megale Idea, the Greeks remained in search of a slightest opportunity for
decades, and even took steps for this cause with a few attempts. By arousing
nationalist and irredentist feelings in Greece, the Cretan crisis of 1896-1897 created
an atmosphere which was suitable for another attempt. The public, opposition and
the Ethnike Hetairia started to pressurize the king and government to lead the
banner of phil-Hellenism once more. Both the king and the premier were cognizant
of the financial and military shortages of Greece. But they were also aware that if
they acted against the screams for war, they could be accused by the public of
being apathetic to the Megale Idea and even be deposed through a civil war. In
order to avoid such a catastrophe, they decided to take the audacious steps of
dispatching a fleet to the Cretan waters, occupying Crete, mobilizing the Greek
army and sending it to the Ottoman frontier. Through these actions, they expected,
on the one hand, to receive the sympathy and support of their public and, on the
other hand, to induce the Great Powers to offer some concessions to Greece for the
sake of overall peace in Europe.
79
The Great Powers indeed did not want to see the crisis turn into a war. Yet
they did not have any intention to make a diplomatic effort which would favor
Greece. If the aggressive policy of Greece returned concrete results, other nations
could follow this example. Initiating fresh competition over the Ottoman territories
would entail rivalry and polarization in Europe. As long as none of them was
willing to enter into competition in the Near East and Balkans that time, the Great
Powers tried to convince the Greeks to retreat on their aggressive policy. But they
did this only by diplomatic means, since the Powers could not agree upon a
collective measure of coercion to be applied on Greece. The lack of a common will
among the Powers persuaded the Greeks not to retreat, and encouraged them even
further on keeping their defiance.
The Ottomans were anxious to maintain peace. However, after the Greek
occupation of Crete, they foresaw further aggressions by Greece and accordingly
decided to amass a massive military force on the Greek border. In spite of the
concentration of Greek troops on the other side of the border, as well as the
ongoing provocative activities of the Greek irregulars, the Ottoman army retained
its defensive position due to categorical orders by the sultan. But the crossings of
border by the army-supported bands of the Ethnike Hetairia obliged the Ottomans
to declare war on Greece.
The Ottoman-Greek War broke out, no matter that the six Powers and the
Ottoman Empire had been against it. In other words, the conservatism of seven
states was not able to thwart the revolutionary overtones in Greece from prompting
the war. Yet, although it had been believed earlier that a war between the Ottoman
Empire and Greece could create serious complications in the Balkans, it was almost
obvious at the outbreak of hostilities that the war would remain a minor and local
conflict. First and foremost, the evident inequality between the strength of the
Greek and Ottoman armies was a sign that the war would shortly be concluded
with the victory of the latter. Indeed, against the massive force of the Ottomans,
80
which numbered around 120,000, the Greeks had to fight with an army of 75,000
soldiers in total.1 Furthermore, it was known that the majority of the Greek officers,
let alone the privates, lacked sufficient training and experience on warfare.2 Falkner
von Sonnenburg, a German army major, observed that the Ottoman preparations
were carried out with vigilance, reason and order unlike the “theater-like actions”
on the Greek side.3 The Greek army also had a shortage of horses, weapons and
munitions while the system of military transportation in Greece was somewhat
primitive.4 A success by the Greek army seemed almost impossible unless an
uprising broke out in Ottoman territories or the other Balkan states involved in the
conflict on the side of Greece. Since none of these two developments seemed
likely, the Great Powers did not have any motivation to intervene actively with the
aim of preventing hostilities.
The neutral attitude the Powers portrayed before and during the war did not
please the Greeks at all. In face of the successive defeats of their army by the
Ottoman forces, Greek statesmen tended to avert public and international pressure
by declaring the Great Powers the scapegoat of the disaster. According to King
George, the Powers, by uniting on the side of the Ottomans, “politically
counterworked and actively opposed every action taken by Greece.”5 His former
ambassador in İstanbul, Mavrokordatos, also believed that it was the attitude of the
Powers which had escalated the Cretan Question towards an Ottoman-Greek war.6
These declarations evidently support the argument that the warlike posture of
Greece had been designed as a bluff rather than an actual defiance of the Ottoman
1 For a general survey on the numbers and positions of Ottoman and Greek troops at the beginning
of the war, see Bigham, 18, 25-26; Bartlett, 139-140, 153-154; Sun, 77-79, 80-84; Goltz Paşa, 65-
68.
2 Nevinson, 280.
3 Goltz Paşa, 24.
4 Tatsios, 112.
5 Bartlett, 310-311.
6 During the war, he told the correspondent of Neue Freie Presse, the Viennese newspaper, that:
“We had to enter Crete…If the restoration of security in the island was entrusted to Vassos, there
would be no need for this bloodshed. But the European Powers did not want an easy resolution for
the problem.” BOA, Y.EE., 145/43.
81
Empire as well as the Great Powers. Greek leaders expected that the Great Powers
would eventually save them through some form of intervention.7 Yet since the
Powers, owing much to the existing international conjuncture, remained unmoved,
the bluff did not bear fruit and, moreover, left Greece alone and helpless against the
militarily superior Ottoman Empire.
Clive Bigham observed that in the eyes of the Ottomans the war was
“purely a punitive enforcement of diplomacy” rather than being a religious or
national campaign.8 Presumably, this is why the Yıldız Palace played the key role
in the direction and supervision of the Ottoman army. Bearing in mind that the
results of the war could be extremely influential on the empire’s foreign policy,
Abdülhamid wanted to exercise full control over the proceedings in the battlefield.
Following the declaration of war, a special military commission, which was to be
headed by the sultan himself, was formed in the palace.9 The instructions on war
plans and army formations were telegrammed to the headquarters from Yıldız and
every single tactic to be used in the battlefield had to be firstly explained to and
authorized from the commission, in other words, by the sultan. Edhem Paşa, the
commander-in chief in Thessaly, had extremely little liberty in his decisions and
practically worked as an intermediary between the army and the palace.10
Although Bulgaria and Serbia had pledged their neutrality earlier, a threat
of mobilization came from the former only a few days after the commencement of
hostilities. The Bulgarian representatives in İstanbul repeated their demands for
appointment of Bulgarian metropolitans and commercial agents to Macedonia and
declared that the Bulgarian army would be mobilized if the Ottomans did not
7 A few months after the war, Deligiannis declared before the Greek chamber that an intervention
from Europe had been hoped until the last minute: Levandis, 89. Nevertheless, this statement may
also be an attempt to attribute the full responsibility of the disaster to the Ethnike Hetairia and the
Great Powers.
8 Bigham, 111-112.
9 Tahsin Paşa, 25.
10 Goltz writes in his account that the mere reason for the appointment of Edhem Paşa to the
commandership of the Ottoman army was his obedient character: Goltz Paşa, 82, 122. Also see
Bigham, 29; Mille, 98.
82
accept the terms.11 This attempt of the Bulgarians was possibly a bluff to acquire
certain rewards in return for their neutrality. The Serbians were also pushing,
though less ardently, for the reopening of Serbian schools in Macedonia and
appointment of a Serbian metropolitan to Üsküb. In order to prevent a Balkan
coalition hostile to the Ottoman Empire, the sultan felt obliged to promise that the
required berats would be granted to both Bulgaria and Serbia as soon as the
conflict with Greece ended.12 This pledge, satisfying both states to a certain degree,
decreased the apprehension in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Europe, that they
could involve in the war. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the Great Powers,
particularly Russia and Austria-Hungary, kept advising the Bulgarians and
Serbians to respect the status-quo and preserve their neutrality.13
The war was fought in two fronts, Epirus and Thessaly. Only a few major
skirmishes occurred in the former,14 while the latter was the scene of the main
course of the war. On 18 April, Ottoman forces seized the control of the Meluna
Pass, an important passage in the north-south direction. On 23 April, the Greek
army was defeated near Mati and, consequently, the town of Tyrnavos (Tırnova)
was captured by the Ottoman army on the following day without any fighting. The
Greek army, along with a considerable number of Greek people, retreated
southwards, to the towns of Trikkala, Pharsalos (Çatalca) and Volo. The Ottoman
army pursued the Greek forces and captured Larissa on 25 April. Three days later,
Trikkala also fell into the hands of the Ottomans. The Greek public blamed the
king and the government for the defeat and the hasty retreat of the army. Furious
demonstrations were organized in the squares of Athens. In order to prevent
11 Papadopoulos, 144; Tatsios, 110.
12 Adanır, 134; Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 354; Türkgeldi, 3: 89.
13 Nikolova, 38; BOA, Y.A.RES., 87/55.
14 The Greek forces on this front occupied the town of Loros at the very beginning of the war; but
following the Battle of Beşpınar (Pentepigadia) on 23 April, they were shortly expelled from the
Ottoman territories. The Ottoman troops kept defending the borderline and did not engage in any
offensive until the end of the war.
83
internal chaos, the king forced the Deligiannis government to resign on 28 April. A
new cabinet was formed immediately by Rallis, the leader of the opposition.15
After the capture of Larissa, the bulk of the Ottoman army proceeded
towards the Aegean coast with the aim of blocking the transfer of reinforcements to
the Greek army.16 In the last days of April, this force was checked by Greek troops
under the command of Colonel Smolenskis on the hills of Valestinos (Velestin).
But the Ottoman forces renewed the attack on 5 May, and forced the Greeks to
retreat on the following day. While the Greek forces were retiring to Almyros
(Ermiye) and Domokos (Dömeke), the Ottoman army captured Pharsalos and Volo
on 6 and 8 May, respectively. After the capture of Volo, the Ottoman troops
remained inactive for about one week, probably due to an order by the sultan with
the expectation that the Powers would make an effort for peace.17
Nevertheless, the efforts of the Ottomans in the battlefield could hardly
produce a substantial result without the consent of the Great Powers. At the time of
the conflict, their engagements in other parts of the world, internal difficulties, as
well as the level of distrust among them dictated the Powers, nolens volens, to act
in concert to maintain the status-quo in Southeastern Europe. Even if assisting one
of the belligerents could be to the advantage of certain Powers, none of them dared
to injure the existing, albeit shaky, harmony in Europe by engaging in unilateral
action.
As early as 21 April, Marschall had called Ali Gâlib Bey, the Ottoman
ambassador in Berlin, and presented the “friendly counsels” of the emperor to him.
Marschall told the ambassador that the Ottoman army would eventually defeat the
Greeks and in order to forestall an intervention by the Great Powers at the end of
the war and to generate a positive impression on them, the Ottoman Empire should
prepare its terms of peace upon these principles:
15 Langer, 375-376; Rose, 163-165.
16 Driault, Şark Mes’elesi, 356.
17 Bartlett, 231.
84
1- The Greek government shall immediately withdraw its forces from
Crete.
2- The Sublime Porte shall categorically declare to the Greek government
that it will accept the autonomous administration of the island, which will
be established by the collective decision of the Great Powers and the
Ottoman Empire.
3- The Ottoman Empire shall not demand any pecuniary indemnity from
the Greek government.18
If these were the “friendly counsels” of the German emperor, who was supposed to
be the European ruler which had the most intimate relations with the sultan, it is
difficult to imagine a worse result for the Ottomans in case of an intervention by
the Powers after their victory. Immediately after the capture of Larissa by the
Ottoman army, Marschall reiterated these counsels of his emperor and advised the
Ottomans to bring the campaign to an end soon.19
The attitude of Germany is enough to indicate that the Great Powers were
resolute to restore the status-quo-ante-bellum after the defiance of the Greeks
would have been punished by the Ottoman army. During the visit of Emperor
Franz Joseph and Goluchowski to St. Petersburg at the end of April, Russia and
Austria-Hungary underlined the necessity of maintaining balances in the Balkans.
This agreement entailed the localization of the Ottoman-Greek War and mediation
in favor of Greece.20 Britain, France and Italy were obviously against any Ottoman
territorial gain. Thus, the earlier declaration by the Powers that the aggressor would
not gain the slightest benefit from the war was practically modified as “none of the
two belligerents would gain anything.” But what would their attitude be if the
Greek army proved superior and captured Ottoman territories is not an easy
question to answer.
Volo was a strategic location for the Greeks with the highest importance,
since almost all supplies and reinforcements for the Greek army had been
transported to the port of that town by sea and dispatched to the battlefield via
18 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/128. These suggestions were also presented to Tevfik Paşa by the
German ambassador on the same day: BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/16.
19 BOA, Y.EE., 145/19.
20 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 400; Jelavich, 212; Langer, 374.
85
railroad then.21 The capture of Volo by the Ottomans thus signified that defeat was
inevitable for the Greeks. On 8 May, Stephanos Skouloudis, the new Greek foreign
minister, informed the representatives of the Great Powers that Colonel Vassos had
already been recalled and all Greek troops in Crete would be withdrawn
gradually.22 Two days later, he formally announced that the autonomy of Crete was
recognized by Greece. Upon this declaration, the representatives of the Powers in
Athens unanimously offered a proposal of mediation to the Greek government. The
Greeks immediately accepted the proposal, stipulating that “Greece would not
respond the amicable initiative and the utmost solicitude of the Powers better than
leaving to them the protection of her interests and adhering unreservedly to their
advices and recommendations.”23
Undertaking the diplomatic patronage of Greece, the Powers made an
appeal to the Sublime Porte for peace. In response, the Ottomans, in contradiction
to their earlier declaration that the war was not waged for the purpose of
occupation, tried to take advantage of their military victory. On 14 May, the
Sublime Porte announced its demands for the suspension of hostilities. These
demands included the retrocession of Thessaly, a pecuniary indemnity of
10,000,000 Ottoman liras and renewal of the treaties between Greece and the
Ottoman Empire, which meant the abolition of the capitulations that had been
granted to the Greek nationals.24 On the same day, the sultan ordered Edhem Paşa
to march on Domokos (Dömeke). This offensive was explained to the Great
Powers as a response to the Greek attacks in Arta on 12 May and Gribovo on 13
and 14 May,25 but it might also be a tactical move to strengthen the position of the
Ottomans in the forthcoming peace negotiations. After a short but furious battle,
21 Bartlett, 230.
22 Turkey No. 11, No. 565; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 402; Yeğen, 290.
23 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 574, 600; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 403-404; Langer, 376; Rose, 217-218.
24 BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 20/908; BOA,Y.A.HUS., 372/41; Turkey No. 11, Nos. 620, 656.
25 Ahmed Refik, Abdülhamid-i Sânî ve Devr-i Saltanatı: Hayât-ı Husûsiyye ve Siyâsiyyesi (İstanbul:
Kitabhâne-i İslâm ve Askerî - İbrahim Hilmi, 1327), 3: 925.
86
Ottoman forces were able to capture Domokos on 18 May and proceeded
westwards, pushing the Greek army back.
The night before the capture of Domokos by the Ottomans, the Russian
czar, assuming the task of mediation for peace, sent a telegram to the sultan.26 With
this telegram, after remarking the friendly relations between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire, and congratulating the successes of the Ottoman army, he
requested the sultan to cease hostilities immediately and accept the mediation of
the Great Powers on behalf of Greece. This notice was quite similar to what the
Austria-Hungarian Emperor had addressed to the Bulgarians when they defeated
the Serbians in 1885, as it was intended to leave the victor frustrated due to the
resolution of the Powers for preserving international balances.27 Nevertheless, the
remarkably gentle phraseology used by the czar in his telegram convinced the
sultan to give an end to hostilities, possibly with an expectation that the czar would
countenance the Ottoman demands for peace.28 Although some Ottoman statesmen
were against ceasefire unless a direct appeal was made from Greece,29 the sultan
issued an irade complying with the request of the czar. Instructions were sent to the
commanders in Epirus and Thessaly to communicate with their Greek counterparts
for the suspension of fighting.30 Hostilities were terminated on 19 May and the
ceasefire was signed the following day.
The demands that had been raised by the Sublime Porte on 14 May were
regarded unanimously by the Great Powers as unacceptable. The ambassadors in
İstanbul submitted their counter-proposals to Tevfik Paşa on 25 May. With this
memorandum, they declared that the Powers would only consent to a rectification
26 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/83. See Appendix F for the full text of this telegram.
27 Nicolae Iorga, Histoire des Etats balcaniques jusqu'à 1924 (Paris: Librairie Universitaire J.
Gamber, 1925), 437.
28 The intention of Nicholas while writing this telegram was to persuade the sultan to cease
hostilities without offending him: Bartlett, 42. Yet the Ottomans expressed themselves proud to
receive such a bombastic and complimentary telegram from the czar. After translating the telegram
into Turkish, Aleksandr Karateodori Paşa, an experienced diplomat, told the ministers around him
that the czars had not written such a telegram to the Ottomans for two centuries: Tahsin Paşa, 66.
29 BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 36.
30 BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/83.
87
of the frontier based on strategic considerations and an indemnity which should not
exceed the limits of the financial resources of Greece. The Ottoman demand for the
renewal of earlier treaties with Greece was also declined on the grounds that
“certain privileges and immunities have been conceded to the Hellenic subjects in
virtue of arrangements concluded with the Great Powers could not be affected by
the rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece.”31
The peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers,
representing Greece, commenced on 4 June and continued throughout the summer
as the Ottomans were unwilling to give up their demands. The sultan regarded
especially the retrocession of Thessaly and the renewal of agreements with Greece
as indispensable terms to be included in the peace treaty.32 He even wrote personal
notes to the German emperor and the Russian czar, indicating that the Ottoman
Empire was ready to undertake a portion of the Greek foreign debt in return for the
town of Larissa.33
Yet, since the Powers were completely against any change in the regional
balances, they firmly opposed an acquisition of territory by the Ottoman Empire
except minor rectifications on the Greek frontier to prevent future incursions by
Greek bandits. The Ottoman demand for abrogation of the capitulations enjoyed by
Greek nationals was also opposed, presumably due to the idea that such a practice
could later be used by the Ottomans as an example for reducing the privileges of
other nationals.34 Instead, the Powers suggested regulating the practice of the
capitulations to eliminate abuses. In addition to these, the Powers, holding bonds in
Greece, endeavored to reduce the Ottoman demands of war indemnity by pointing
out that the economy and finances of Greece would not allow the payment of an
extensive sum of money. Upon prolongation of the negotiations, the King George’s
threats of abdication were received in Europe with anxiety and the Powers
31 Turkey No. 11, No. 690.
32 BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/37.
33 BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 38-39; Türkgeldi, 3: 80.
34 Turkey No. 11, Nos. 607, 619; Tatsios, 129.
88
increased pressure on the sultan accordingly.35 The diplomatic attempts by both the
sultan and Tevfik Paşa were refused by the Great Powers. As Holstein stated, the
sultan could “only offer resistance in questions on which Europe is divided and the
Powers impede[d] each other by taking opposite views.”36 But during the peace
negotiations, the Great Powers never relinquished their collective attitude against
the Ottoman demands.
On 12 June, the Sublime Porte acquiesced to strategic rectifications on the
Greek frontier and reduced its demand of pecuniary indemnity to 5,000,000 liras on
28 June. But the Powers insisted on their offer of 4,000,000. This offer was
accepted by Tevfik Paşa in one month’s time.37 Finally, the preliminaries of peace
were concluded by Tevfik Paşa and the ambassadors of the six Powers in İstanbul
on 18 September. The peace treaty, which was basically an official confirmation of
these preliminaries, was signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire on 4
December, in İstanbul.38
The phrase that any territory that had ever been Christian would not be
allowed to become Muslim was used as a motto by the European statesmen while
opposing the retrocession of Thessaly. Rather than being based on merely religious
concerns, this principle was more likely a policy for the maintenance of the
European Concert. This is because, one of the basic problems of the Eastern
Question was the elimination of the problems faced by the Christian populations
under Muslim rule. The lack of tranquility which had been persisting in various
parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Eastern Anatolia, Macedonia and Crete, was
already a big threat for the fragile balances within European politics. In this
respect, retrocession of Thessaly to Ottoman rule would certainly create a new
scene of quarrel and trouble which could spur the conflict of interests in Europe.
35 Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 42; Tatsios, 120.
36 German Diplomatic Documents, 2: XII. 427.
37 Ahmed Refik, 3: 937-938.
38 See Appendix G for the official texts of the Preliminaries of Peace and the Peace Treaty.
89
Even though the actual belligerents were Greece and the Ottoman Empire, it
is difficult to regard these states as the real actors of the crisis. This is because,
neither the aggressive policy of Greece which prompted the war, nor the decisive
victory of the Ottoman Empire in the battlefield could determine the result. Given
the neutrality of the other Balkan states, the war was nothing more than a
circumscribed test of strength. After the outbreak of hostilities the Great Powers
repeatedly declared that neither of the belligerents would be able to make any
change on the existing map of Southeastern Europe.39 As articulated by a
contemporary observer, the Powers “behaved like the managers of a prize-fight.
They held the stakes… and laid down the rules of the game.”40 The only dangerous
situation the war could bring forth would be the total defeat and collapse of one
side. Such a possibility was prevented through a reasonably punctual mediation.
The Powers did not allow the Ottomans to convert their decisive victory in the
battlefield to material gains more than a mediocre war indemnity. The military and
economic losses of Greece that had been caused by the war were offset by the de
facto termination of Ottoman sovereignty over Crete one year later. This later move
by the Powers also forestalled probable demands for revenge in Greece. The result
was completely in accordance with the desire of Europe: Nothing changed in the
balances and stability was preserved.
39 Rose, 271.
40 Odysseus, 342-343.
90
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96
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Map of the War Region
Source: 1897 Türk-Yunan Savaşı (Tesalya Tarihi), prepared by Bayram Kodaman (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu, 1993).
97
APPENDIX B: A Proclamation Encouraging Greek Action in Macedonia
Published in August 1896 by a Greek journal called Olympos. BOA, Y.A.HUS., 360/33.
98
APPENDIX C: The Ottoman Attempt for Direct Negotiations with Greece
BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/60.
99
APPENDIX D: Verbal Note by the Ottoman Empire to the Great Powers
BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/13.
100
APPENDIX E: The Decision of the Ottoman Council of Ministers on War
BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32.
101
APPENDIX F: The Telegram of Czar Nicholas II to Sultan Abdülhamid II
BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/83.